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“[I]t always does very great harm to the community to encourage ignorance, error, or
deception, in a profession that deals with the life and health of our fellow-creatures.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
The rising cost of practicing medicine, the increase in health care
regulations and enforcement in wake of the Affordable Care Act, and the
prevalence of managed care have left physicians with a profession that is
less profitable than it once was for many specialties.2 In response to these
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, SR., HOMEOPATHY AND ITS KINDRED DELUSIONS: TWO
LECTURES iii-iv (Boston, William D. Ticknor 1842).
2. See LEWIS A. LEFKO, IMPROPER AND ILLEGAL BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMAGING,
INFUSION, CLINICAL LABORATORIES AND OTHER ANCILLARY SERVICES, AHLA-PAPERS
P02080607, Westlaw (2006) (“With the increase in health care regulations and prevalence of managed
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market changes, among other reasons, many physicians have expanded the
reach of their medical practices by investing in the provision of ancillary
health care services.3 Physicians supplement income from their normal
practice with the profits realized from ownership interests in toxicology
laboratories, imaging centers, and even pharmacies.4 But physicians are
not simply passive investors in these organizations that provide ancillary
services. They also serve as referral sources, directing their own patients to
these laboratories and imaging centers when the patient is in need of
additional health screening.5
care, physicians have found their profession to be less profitable than in the past.”); Parija
Kavilanz, Medicare Doctors’ Pay to be Cut, CNN MONEY (Mar. 3, 2013, 5:34 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/02/smallbusiness/medicare-doctors-spending-cuts/
[https://
perma.cc/2EX6-EZ58] (announcing the tough reality that most physicians treating Medicare
beneficiaries will be reimbursed cents on the dollar for their services); Parija Kavilanz, Doctors Going
Broke, CNN MONEY (Jan. 6, 2012, 9:39 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/05/smallbusiness/
doctors_broke/index.htm?iid=EL [https://perma.cc/DCK2-CFXB] (“Doctors list shrinking
insurance reimbursements, changing regulations, rising business and drug costs among the factors
preventing them from keeping their practices afloat.”).
3. LEFKO, supra note 2; accord OFFICE OF ANALYSIS AND INSPECTION, OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., OAI-12-88-01410, FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND
HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES 11 (1989) [hereinafter FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS] (“Referring
physicians invest in a wide range of businesses. They hold interests not only in independent clinical
and physiological laboratories and durable medical equipment suppliers . . . but also in home health
agencies, hospitals, nursing homes, ambulatory surgical centers, and health maintenance
organizations.”); Patrick A. Sutton, The Stark Law in Retrospect, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 15, 30, 46
(2011) (noting the exceptions to the Stark Law for certain ancillary services and how to prevent
overutilization by physicians); Nancy L. Zisk, Investing in Health Care: What Happens When Physicians
Invest and Why the Recent Changes in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Fail to Protect Patients from
their Physicians’ Self-Interest, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 189, 189 (2012) (commenting that most physicians
make money today “by investing in the diagnostic tools and services they recommend” to their
patients).
4. See FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 3, at 11 (examining the prevalence of physician
compensation with related businesses in the medical industry, focusing on clinical laboratories);
Martin F. Idzik, Note, Physician Ownership in Pharmacies, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 49, 51 (1965) (“As the
drug market expanded, and profits became greater, it was only natural for some physicians to look to
pharmacy as a profitable investment.” (footnote omitted)).
5. Zisk, supra note 3, at 190–91, 195; Marc. A. Rodwin, Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest: The
Limitations of Disclosure, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1405, 1405 (1989); Rune J. Sórensen & Jostein
Grytten, Competition and Supplier-Induced Demand in a Health Care System with Fixed Fees, 8 HEALTH
ECON. 497, 497 (1999); Sutton, supra note 3, at 20. In the 1989 report to Congress, the Office of
Analysis and Inspection found:
Patients of referring physicians who own or invest in [independent clinical laboratories] received
45 percent more clinical laboratory services than all Medicare patients in general, regardless of
place of service. They also received 34 percent more services from independent clinical
laboratories than all Medicare patients in general. This increased utilization of clinical
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Meanwhile, physicians have come to realize the benefits of such
business endeavors. They may enjoy the provision of improved,
comprehensive medical services to patients.6 It is more convenient to
have a readily available, trusted ancillary services provider to which they
can refer patients with confidence. If they have an ownership interest in
the facility, they may be endowed with governing authority to help ensure
the quality of the services their patients receive.7
A diversified medical practice generating such an apparent set of
benefits would hardly seem to be grounds for the FBI knocking at a
physician’s door or the state attorney general’s office serving her with
lawsuit documents.8 In spite of such assumptions, the financial and
referral relationships physicians have with ancillary services facilities may
not be as innocuous as they seem.9
Investment opportunities are susceptible of being assorted into a class
of suspect, and possibly unethical, business practices. This sort of practice
may consist of a psychiatric mental hospital that covertly pays school
guidance counselors to advise the guardians of students to admit their
children into the hospital for long-term stays at the guardian’s expense.10
laboratory services by patients of physician-owners cost the Medicare program $28 million in
1987. This figure does not include any cost associated with increased utilization resulting from
physician ownership interests in entities other than independent clinical laboratories.
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 3, at 18.
6. See Julie Foreman, Physician Ownership of Health Care Facilities, 108 ARCH. OPHTHALMOL.
1077, 1077 (1990) (detailing the “two-sided coin” that is physician investment, noting it “possess[es]
the potential to improve quality of care” but also warning that it leads to an overutilization of services
and conflicts of interest that may negatively impact the provision of services).
7. Cf. Zisk, supra note 3, at 195 (“Critics of limiting physician ownership argue that a
physician’s financial interest in the facility or diagnostic or treatment service to which he or she refers
patients ‘creates a strong incentive to ensure that it provides high-quality care.’” (quoting Dennis F.
Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest, 329 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 573, 573 (1993))).
8. See Kathleen Quiroz & Clifford E. Robertson, More and More Physicians Finding FBI Knocking
on Door, SAN ANTONIO M.D. NEWS (June 22, 2015), http://sanantonio.mdnews.com/more-andmore-physicians-finding-fbi-knocking-door [https://perma.cc/G3KN-VZD5] (warning physicians to
evaluate existing and potential arrangements with healthcare providers and suppliers to ensure they
are complying with federal and state fraud and abuse laws).
9. See, e.g., Foreman, supra note 6, at 1077 (“[O]verutiliz[ation of] services and the conflict[s] of
interest may have the negative effect of increasing Medicare costs, jeopardizing the quality of patient
care and improperly influencing the physician’s exercise of his independent professional judgment.”
(quoting Theodore N. McDowell, Jr., Physician Self Referral Arrangements: Legitimate Businesses or Unethical
“Entrepreneurialism”, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 61, 65 (1989))).
10. See Gregg Timmons, Comment, Crisis in the Mental Health Care Industry: An Analysis of the
Practices of Private, For-Profit Psychiatric Hospitals and the Governmental Response, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 323,
331–32 (1994) (recounting a similar story in the early 1990s out of Lubbock, Texas).
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Or that of a drug treatment center that compensates a local pharmacy
employee $250 for each underage pregnant girl he refers to the center
requesting emergency contraception pills under a threat of contacting the
girl’s parents or local authorities.11 What physicians who invest in
ancillary services facilities may have in common with the scenarios above
is that they may be engaging in the practice of exchanging illegal
remuneration for healthcare patient referrals.
Through the eyes of the law, the revenues a physician realizes from the
profits of the ancillary services facility to which she refers her patients may
be viewed in the same manner as the kickback to the school counselor and
the $250-per-head bounty the pharmacy employee earns. All of these
payments are made in exchange for the person’s referral; and such
remuneration’s potential to compromise a physician’s better medical
judgment, at the expense of a patient’s wellbeing, is too great a risk.
Consequently, Congress and state legislatures have enacted laws that
prohibit self-referrals and the exchange of remuneration for referrals, if the
provision of ancillary services is not properly structured.12 The most
prominent of these statutes are the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute (the
Anti-Kickback Statute)13 and the Physician Self-Referral Law—more
commonly referred to as the Stark Law.14 In the State of Texas, the
Patient Solicitation Act (the TPSA)15 follows the Anti-Kickback Statute,
prohibiting financial payments and rewards for patient referrals.16
11. See Kathryn Leaman, State Anti-Kickback Statutes: Where the Action Is, HEALTH L. & POL’Y,
Fall 2008, at 22, 22 (describing the actual events of a similar story in which drug-abuse counselors
threatened pregnant women with adverse state action unless the women enrolled in a specific drug
treatment center that was surreptitiously paying the counselors a kickback for each woman referred).
12. Leaman also recognizes that while Congress passed the Anti-Kickback Statute, there are
several well-recognized exceptions to help guide a physician’s structuring of the transaction: “The
statute contains many exceptions, including but not limited to: (1) properly disclosed discounts; (2) a
bona fide employee-employer relationship; (3) specific waivers of co-insurances; (4) specific
arrangements between vendors and vendees; (5) certain managed care arrangements; and (6) any
other arrangements exempted in the regulations.” Id. at 23.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012), see discussion infra Part II.A.1 for a further discussion of the
Federal Anti-Kickback Statute and its provisions.
14. Id. § 1395nn. Though the Stark Law is a significant federal statute that health care
practitioners and attorneys are strongly encouraged to be mindful of, it is not at the heart of this
Article and, consequently, will not be evaluated in depth herein.
15. Also known as the Texas Anti-Solicitation Act or the Texas Illegal Remuneration Act.
TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 102.001 (West 2012).
16. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (prohibiting remuneration for referrals and providing a
violation amounts to a felony), with OCC. §§ 102.001(b)–(c) (following the language of the
Anti-Kickback statute by making remuneration for solicitations an offense).
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Generally, the Anti-Kickback Statute is implicated when remunerations
are solicited, offered, or exchanged for referrals for services or items for
which payment may be made, in whole or in part, under a Federal health
care program (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, TriCare).17 The TPSA, however,
is not limited to arrangements involving a Federal health care program, but
prohibits any remuneration-for-referrals arrangements, even if they involve
private payors.18 The TPSA does, however, permit any arrangements and
practices that the Anti-Kickback Statute permits.19
Many medical professionals and health care attorneys are intimately
familiar with, and prudently observe, the provisions of the Anti-Kickback
Statute and the Stark Law.20 It is not apparent, however, that the TPSA is
afforded the same level of deference.21 Presently in Texas, many health
care attorneys and, consequently, their health care provider clients, are
vulnerable to a disconcerting interpretation of the TPSA; to wit: it is
unenforceable. More specifically, because the TPSA, as currently written,
permits any remuneration arrangements that the Anti-Kickback Statute
permits, it is easy to believe that the TPSA is only applicable in
circumstances that implicate a Federal health care program.22 The
argument proceeds that since the Anti-Kickback Statute permits any
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b, 1395nn. “Federal health care program” is defined as “(1) any plan
or program that provides health benefits, whether directly, through insurance, or otherwise, which is
funded directly, in whole or in part, by the United States Government (other than the health
insurance program under chapter 89 of title 5); or (2) any State health care program, as defined in
section 1320a-7(h) of [Title 42].” Id. § 1320a-7b(f).
18. See OCC. § 102.001(a) (prohibiting “any remuneration” (emphasis added)); see also Martin
Merritt, Texas AG Probes Physician Investment in Pharmacies, PHYSICIANS PRAC. (Feb. 22,
2015), http://www.physicianspractice.com/blog/texas-ag-probes-physician-investment-pharmacies
[https://perma.cc/PTA5-AT3Z] (“The statute is not limited to Medicare and Medicaid, but applies
equally to private insurance and cash payers.”). The prohibitions will be discussed in much greater
detail at Part II.A.2 infra.
19. See OCC. § 102.003 (“Section 102.001 permits any payment, business arrangement, or
payment practice permitted by 42 U.S.C. Section 1320a-7b(b) or any regulation adopted under that
law.”).
20. See, e.g., Rob Lebow, Complying with the Stark Law Across Multiple Center Locations, JUCM
(Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.jucm.com/complying-stark-law-across-multiple-center-locations/
[https://perma.cc/X2WT-FBJK] (illustrating the compliance with federal regulations and law
regarding ancillary services).
21. See Kenya S. Woodruff & Jennifer S. Kreick, Physician Investment in Compounding
Pharmacies—Under Fire from Texas AG?, HAYNESBOONE (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.
haynesboone.com/alerts/physician-investment-in-compounding-pharmacies-under-fire-from-texasag [https://perma.cc/E6ZF-WJ7F] (“While the Texas Anti-Solicitation Statute has been in place
since 1999, a review of recent case law indicates it rarely has been enforced.”).
22. OCC. § 102.003.
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arrangement that doesn’t implicate a Federal health care program, then the
TPSA permits the same, thus making the TPSA’s proscriptions no broader
than the Anti-Kickback Statute.23
With this interpretation of the law in mind, Texas attorneys may be
running the risk of counseling health care providers that the TPSA is
unenforceable due to its ambiguity. Does it prohibit all remunerations
made in exchange for patient referrals, or is it only concerned with
arrangements involving Federal health care programs? Alternatively,
counsel may suggest that the TPSA allows physicians to be less cautious
when referring patients to ancillary services facilities in which the
physicians have ownership stake, so long as the facilities don’t bill or
implicate any Federal health care program. This kind of flawed advice is
caused by the erroneous reasoning and subsequent rationalization of a
poorly drafted statute that jeopardizes thousands of Texas physicians.
This Article seeks not only to bring the TPSA into greater focus for
Texas physicians and their legal representatives, but also to preemptively
dispel a potentially viral misunderstanding of the law. In general, this
Article expects to clarify the purpose, construction, and effect of the
TPSA. More pointedly, this Article aims to inform Texas medical
practitioners, and the attorneys who represent them, about the very serious
consequences of illegal remuneration arrangements and how those
consequences are appearing in greater frequency, under varying laws, and
from different prosecutors—both familiar and unexpected. Finally, this
Article aims to help the Texas legislature recognize the risks physicians
face in misinterpreting the TPSA, and to encourage the legislature to
amend and clarify its statutory language.
In Part II, this Article will briefly examine the general provisions of the
Anti-Kickback Statute. This background will provide context for the
proceeding thorough examination of the TPSA’s purpose, legislative
history, and the posited intent of the Texas Legislature in passing and
amending the TPSA.
In Part III, this Article will discuss the implications of Texas physicians
engaging in arrangements that may constitute illegal remuneration
practices. In doing so, the discussion will review and examine recent cases
23. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(1)–(2) (2012) (providing liability for violations for any
person who “knowingly or willfully” solicits or offers in connection with a Federal health care
program), with OCC. §102.001 (“A person commits an offense if the person knowingly offers . . . or
agrees to accept . . . any remuneration . . . .” (emphasis added)), and OCC. § 102.003 (permitting any
practice permitted under the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute).
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of referral misconduct and additional statutes that prohibit illegal
remuneration arrangements.
The analysis will provide better
understanding of how physicians’ relationships with, and investments in,
ancillary services facilities are receiving, and may continue to receive,
unexpected attention from the government and other private actors.
Additionally, this section will review trends in the structure of investments
in ancillary facilities. That discussion will provide better insight into how a
practitioner or attorney may identify suspicious business arrangements and
how investment structures reveal the potential liability under illegal
remuneration laws.
Finally, Part IV of this Article will suggest revisions to the TPSA’s
current language. The suggested amendments are intended to clarify any
ambiguity, dispel contentions of the TPSA’s unenforceability, and
unequivocally provide physicians and their attorneys with sufficient
certainty of the TPSA’s prohibitions.
II. ILLEGAL REMUNERATION LEGISLATION
A. Overview of the Federal and State Statutes
1.

Federal Anti-Kickback Statute

The Anti-Kickback Statute is a criminal statute that prohibits the
knowing and willful exchange—or offer to exchange—of anything of
value, in an effort to induce or reward referrals of business involving a
Federal health care program.24 The Anti-Kickback Statute is designed “to
protect patients from inappropriate medical referrals or recommendations
by health care professionals who may be unduly influenced by financial
incentives.”25 Its original purpose was to protect patients and Federal
health care programs from fraud and abuse.26
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b). For purposes herein, the Anti-Kickback Statute shall refer to the
provisions under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
25. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SPECIAL
FRAUD ALERT: LABORATORY PAYMENTS TO REFERRING PHYSICIANS 1 (2014) [hereinafter
LABORATORY PAYMENTS TO REFERRING PHYSICIANS].
26. See OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FEDERAL ANTI-KICKBACK
LAWS AND REGULATORY SAFE HARBORS 1 (1999) [hereinafter LAWS AND REGULATORY SAFE
HARBORS] (“On the books since 1972, the federal anti-kickback law’s main purpose is to protect
patients and the federal health care programs from fraud and abuse by curtailing the corrupting
influence of money on health care decisions.”).
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The Anti-Kickback Law is triggered by, among other things, referrals
for any items or services that are reimbursable by Medicare, Medicaid,
TriCare, CHIP, or any other Federal health care program.27 In other
words, the Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits anyone from knowingly and
willfully accepting, providing, or inducing illegal remuneration (e.g.,
kickbacks),28 in cash or in kind, in exchange for referring patients, whose
care is paid for in whole or in part under a Federal health care program, to
another person or organization. The payment or offer of remuneration as
an inducement for referrals need not be the primary purpose of the
relationship between the parties.29 Even if, for example, the payment
compensated the referring physician for providing specific services, as long
as one purpose of the payment was intended to induce referrals, the
federal statute has been violated.30 The law is also dual-edged in that it
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
28. The Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits the exchange of “any remuneration (including any
kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind,” for referrals
implicating Federal health care programs. Id. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(1)–(2). One commentator adequately
explained the meaning of “kickback” in this context:
A kickback is generally defined as a payment by a seller of a portion of the purchase price to the
buyer to induce the purchase or future purchases. Kickbacks, like bribes, seek to buy the loyalty
of someone in a position of trust. For example, a supplier of medical gauze who pays a
kickback to a hospital’s purchasing agent does so to buy the loyalty and duty owed by that agent
to the hospital to make purchasing decisions based on the best interest of the hospital. Antikickback statutes are similar to statutes prohibiting bribery, however, in that they are both
directed at the form of the transaction itself, the buying of loyalty.
Charles J. Williams, Toward A Comprehensive Health Care Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 UMKC L. REV. 291,
293 (1995) (footnote omitted).
29. See, e.g., Special Fraud Alert: Physician-Owned Entities, 78 Fed. Reg. 19271, 19272 (Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs. March 29, 2013) (notice) (“The anti-kickback statute is violated if even
one purpose of the remuneration is to induce such referrals.”).
30. See United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 72 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding the statute was violated
“even if the payments were also intended to compensate for professional services” because they were
partially used to induce the physician to use services in the future); see also United States v. Borrasi,
639 F.3d 774, 781 (7th Cir. 2011) (concluding there was persuasive authority which weighed heavily
against adopting a “primary motivation” test; most would agree that the remuneration need only be
one purpose in the transaction); United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 835 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“[A] person who offers or pays remuneration to another person violates the Act so long as one
purpose of the offer or payment is to induce Medicare or Medicaid patient referrals.”); United States
v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092, 1094 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming the district court’s determination that the
inducement for referrals need not be the only purpose for the payments); United States v. Kats,
871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (agreeing with the Third Circuit in Greber, that “[e]ven
if the physician performs some service for the money received, the potential for unnecessary drain on
the Medicare system remains” (quoting Greber, 760 F.2d at 71)).
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ascribes criminal liability to both the party who accepts or solicits the
kickback and the party who furnishes or offers the kickback.31 Each
violation of the statute constitutes a felony punishable by a maximum fine
of $100,000, imprisonment up to ten years, or both.32
Congress recognized that the Anti-Kickback Statute implicates a broad
range of potentially innocuous commercial transactions. Consequently,
certain payment arrangements and practices are specifically exempted by
the statute.33 Congress also authorized the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to adopt
regulations as “Safe Harbors” that shield certain payment and business
practices from prosecution under the Anti-Kickback Statute.34 These Safe
Harbor provisions specify various arrangements that will not be treated as
criminal offenses under the Anti-Kickback Statute, despite the fact that
they may very well be capable of inducing referrals of Federal health care
program business.35
Since 1991, the OIG has enacted over twenty regulatory Safe Harbor
provisions developed “to limit the reach of the [Anti-Kickback Statute]
somewhat by permitting certain non-abusive arrangements, while
encouraging beneficial or innocuous” activity.36 Practices and transactions
not specifically included in the statutory exceptions, or protected under the
31. McClatchey, 217 F.3d at 835.
32. The Anti-Kickback statute previously provided for penalties up to $25,000, and
imprisonment up to five years; however, it was recently amended in February of 2018 to provide for
increased penalties for violations. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, § 50412,
132 Stat. 64, 220–21 (2018) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C § 1320a-7b). Violations under the AntiKickback Statute may also serve as a basis for liability under the Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C
§§ 3729–33. Id. § 1320a-7b(g). The False Claims Act prohibits persons from knowingly submitting
false or fraudulent claims to the government for payment. 31 USC § 3729(a)(1) (2012). Convictions
thereunder subject the violator to civil penalties of $5,000 to $10,000 plus three times the damages
the U.S. Government sustains because of the violators acts. Id. For further discussion of the False
Claims Act and liability thereunder, see infra notes 229–35 and accompanying text.
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3) (providing specific exceptions such as discounts or
reductions, employer payments made to employees, certain amounts paid by vendors of goods, and
coinsurance provisions, among others).
34. Id. §1320a-7b(b)(3)(E). These “safe harbors” are published in the Code of Federal
Regulations. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2015).
35. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revisions to Safe
Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, and Civil Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding Beneficiary
Inducements and Gainsharing, 79 Fed. Reg. 59717, 59717–18 (Oct. 3, 2014) (codified at 42 C.F.R.
pts. 1001 & 1003) (acknowledging the need for safe harbors because certain services may be at low
risk of harming Federal health care programs if properly structured).
36. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback
Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35952, 35958 (July 29, 1991) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
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Safe Harbors, are not necessarily per se violations of the Anti-Kickback
Statute, but are analyzed by the OIG on a case-by-case basis to determine
compliance with the statute.37
What should be understood is that the federal regulations that outline
the Safe Harbors “do[] not expand the scope of activities that the
[Anti-Kickback Statute] prohibits.”38 The 1991 OIG Anti-Kickback
Provisions Final Rule clearly states that its purpose, in fulfilling the
Congressional mandate under Section 14 of Public Law 100-93, was to
specify various payment practices that will be protected from criminal
prosecution and civil sanctions under the Anti-Kickback Statute.39 The
Safe Harbors, therefore, are designed to define specific practices that
should not be prosecuted under the federal statute, despite the fact that
those practices are potentially capable of violating the Anti-Kickback
Therefore, the Safe Harbor regulations only describe
Statute.40
specifically permitted conduct—conduct exempt from the Anti-Kickback
Statute. They do not describe prohibited conduct. “The [federal] statute
itself describes the scope of illegal activities.”41
2.

The Texas Patient Solicitation Act
a.

The Health Care Preface to Legislative Action

Texas’s own illegal remuneration law, the TPSA,42 was the result of an
abhorrent culture of abusive practices within the mental health industry at
the beginning of the 1990s.43 During the early 1980s, a combination of
government-created-favorable-financial conditions and dramatic relaxing
of state regulations on mental health treatment facilities resulted in an
explosion in the number of private psychiatric hospitals across the
37. See LAWS AND REGULATORY SAFE HARBORS, supra note 26, at 1 (“Compliance with safe
harbors is voluntary, and arrangements that do not comply with a safe harbor must be analyzed on a
case-by-case basis for compliance with the anti-kickback statute. Parties who are uncertain whether
their arrangements qualify for safe harbor protection may request an advisory opinion.”).
38. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback
Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35954.
39. Id. at 35952.
40. See id. at 35958 (asserting that these practices would otherwise be illegal under the
provisions of the Act).
41. Id. at 35954.
42. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 102.001 (West 2012).
43. See generally Timmons, supra note 10, at 325–40 (“Once the reports of abuses came to the
knowledge of the general public, all branches of Texas government began to investigate the actions
of private for-profit psychiatric hospitals.”).
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country.44 In Texas alone, the amount more than doubled in number,
from thirty-four in 1984 to eighty-six in 1991, despite the fact that the
number of total hospitals decreased nearly 7% over the same period.45
As the late 1980s rolled in, the lax, profitable health-care marketplace
had significantly increased psychiatric care costs and competition among
private psychiatric hospitals.46 Insurers responded to the increased costs
of care by decreasing coverage for mental health care, restricting
reimbursement for psychiatric services, and instituting the use of managed
care companies.47 Thereafter, psychiatric hospitals found their revenues
falling.48
These financial complications for private psychiatric hospitals,
combined with the oversaturation of the psychiatric health care
marketplace, spawned the environment of abusive practices that ultimately
became “the focus of the legislative, administrative, and judicial
investigations.”49 Reports of egregious private psychiatric hospital
business practices and abuses sparked all branches of the Texas
government to begin industry-wide investigations.50
44. The federal government exempted psychiatric care from the list of diagnostic related
groups—“which set the limit of reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid that it would allow for
medical treatment based upon the medical diagnosis or type of surgery performed”—allowing
reimbursement for those services generally at the hospital’s discretion. Id. at 326 (first citing Susan
Gilbert, Is America Abandoning Sick Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1990, § 6, at 22; and then citing
Susan Moffat, Hospitals: Tactics of Psychiatric Facilities, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1992, at A24). Additionally,
Texas repealed laws that enforced “certificate of need” restrictions on building hospitals, enabling
entities to build hospitals without obtaining governmental approval. Mark Smith, Profitable Addictions:
Marketing Blitz Straddles Line of Medical Ethics, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 8, 1991, at A21. Finally, in 1983,
the Texas Legislature enacted certain licensing inspection laws that allowed newer psychiatric
hospitals to never be inspected by the state. Mark Smith & Cindy Rugeley, Profitable Addictions: New
Psychiatric Hospital Law Flawed, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 15, 1991, at D1, 8D; see also Leslie Berkman,
Hospital Firm Shows It’s Not Afraid of Risks, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1991, at D1, D7 (“David Langness,
spokesman for the Southern California Hospital Council[] [said:] ‘There is a major shake-out
occurring in the industry.’”). Between 1980 and 1988, private psychiatric hospitals increased in
number from 17,157 to 42,615, almost doubling in size. Id.
45. Smith, supra note 44, at A21.
46. Timmons, supra note 10, at 329.
47. Id. at 329–30.
48. See id. at 330 (“This decrease reduced available revenue to these hospitals because they bill
inpatients a certain amount per day.”).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 340. One standout abuse occurred in 1991, when employees of a private security
firm apprehended a 14-year-old boy under threat of establishing a criminal record for him if he did
not cooperate. Id. at 332. The security agents were operating under the auspices of a doctor at a
private psychiatric facility, Colonial Hills Hospital, who never examined or treated the boy but
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The Bills and the Law

The TPSA was first introduced during the state’s budget crisis in 1991,
as part of a sweeping landmark legislation under House Bill 7 (HB 7),
discussed in the first called session of the 72nd Texas Legislature.51
Within the wide-encompassing HB 7, the TPSA was established with near
parallel provisions of the Anti-Kickback Statute.52 The Texas law made
“it a criminal offense for health-care professionals to offer to pay or agree
to accept remuneration for securing or soliciting patients or patronage.”53
The provision sought to “prohibit[] the payment of a ‘bounty’ for referring
patients to particular health facilities.”54
Most significantly, the TPSA was not limited in the same manner as the
Anti-Kickback Statute. Unlike the federal statute, the TPSA makes no
ordered the security officers to detain him. Id. The boy, Jeremy, had a younger brother undergoing
an evaluation at Colonial Hills, and the doctor ordered Jeremy to be detained, based on an allegation
by his younger brother that Jeremy used drugs. Gordon Witkin et al., Health Care Fraud, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT, Feb. 24, 1991, at 34, 38, 41. Under the guise of drug-use allegations, the boy
was admitted to Colonial Hills on an emergency basis and held for six days. Id. at 38. He was
released only after then-State Senator Frank Tejada assisted in obtaining a writ of habeas corpus for
his release. Timmons, supra note 10, at 343; Witkin, supra, at 38. The hospital was alleged to have
apprehended and detained the boy because he was fully covered for psychiatric care by CHAMPUS,
the predecessor to TriCare. Id. at 41. A drug test during the boy’s hospital stay revealed no drug use.
Timmons, supra note 10, at 332. This incident sparked national media coverage and is credited as the
impetus for the Texas legislature’s passage of the TPSA. See id. at 333, 343 (noting the incident
identified above, along with multiple other reports of abuse, resulted in legislative, administrative, and
state action to remedy the abuses); see also STEPHEN KLAIDMAN, CORONARY: A TRUE STORY OF
MEDICINE GONE AWRY 9–10 (2007) (stating that the business plan of the psychiatric company’s
business was “to identify and admit patients with good insurance coverage” rather than considering
the need of the patient).
51. Act of Aug. 9, 1991, 72d Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 15, § 5.21, sec. 161.091, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws
325, 325, repealed by Act of May 31, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 388, § 6, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 1083,
2440; Bee Moorhead, Fixes to Health and Human Services Will Keep Evolving, STATESMAN
(Nov. 19, 2014, 6:00 PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/opinion/moorhead-fixes-health-andhuman-services-will-keep-evolving/59nRpDk5OEsjCq5uI7k9OM/ [https://perma.cc/N622-LTLY].
Among other things, HB 7 had the purpose and effect of consolidating twelve state agencies into the
singular Health and Human Services Commission, creating a task force to study consolidation and
closure of mental health and mental retardation facilities, and adding new enforcement powers for
child-support collection. See H. Comm. on Appropriations, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 7, 72nd Leg., 1st
C.S. (July 24, 1991) (consolidating twelve state agencies into the Health and Human Services
Commission).
52. See GARY E. MCCLANAHAN, STATE ILLEGAL-REMUNERATION AND SELF-REFERRAL
LAWS 6 (2d ed. 2005) (“Texas’[s] illegal-remuneration law begins with a close paraphrase of the
federal statute . . . .”).
53. HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT: SUMMARY OF 1991
SPECIAL SESSION LEGISLATION, No. 173, 72nd Leg., 1st C.S., at 70 (1991).
54. Id.
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reference to Federal health care programs.55 The letter of the law, as
originally codified at then Texas Health and Safety Code § 161.091 (THSC
§ 161.091),56 prohibited persons licensed, certified, or registered by a
Texas health care regulatory agency from intentionally or knowingly
offering or agreeing to accept “any remuneration, directly or indirectly,
overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind, to or from any person . . . [or entity]
for securing or soliciting patients or patronage.”57 The TPSA does not
require the remuneration to be tied to Federal health care programs, but
instead prohibits the remuneration from any source, which would seem to
include private health insurance and cash payments.58
The TPSA does, however, articulate exceptions to its prohibitions with
reference to the Anti-Kickback Statute. THSC § 161.091(f) originally read:
“This section shall not be construed to prohibit any payment, business
arrangements, or payments practice not prohibited by 42 U.S.C. Section
1320a-7b(b) or any regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.”59 Facially,
this provision would appear to limit the TPSA’s prohibitions to those
practices prohibited by the federal statute; however, this subsection also
created the potential for an ambiguous reading of the TPSA, which has the
unintended potential of rendering the law unenforceable. This ambiguity
will be addressed later in this Article.60 Nevertheless, a plain reading of
the Texas statute seems to intimate a set of prohibitions on illegal
remuneration for referrals, unbridled by considerations of Federal health
care programs.
In 1993, the TPSA underwent several amendments as a part of the
Texas Legislature’s response to the findings of the Special Senate Interim
Committee on Health and Human Services’ investigation into healthcare

55. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012) (limiting application to Federal health care
programs), with TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 102.001 (West 2012) (providing that any remuneration is a
violation of Texas’s illegal remuneration statute).
56. The Texas Illegal Remuneration Statute was originally published in the Texas Health and
Safety Code, however, the 76th Legislature repealed and placed the statute into the Texas
Occupations Code in 1999. Act of May 31, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 388, § 6, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws
1083, 2440 (codified at OCC. § 102.001).
57. Act of Aug. 9, 1991, 72nd Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 15, § 5.21, sec. 161.091, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws
325, 325–26 (repealed 1999) (emphasis added).
58. See OCC. § 102.001 (prohibiting remuneration for “securing or soliciting a patient” but not
requiring the compensation be in connection to any Federal health care program).
59. Act of Aug. 9, 1991, § 5.21, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws at 326.
60. See Part II.B.1 infra (discussing the potential ambiguity in the TPSA).
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abuses in 1991.61 The amendments to the TPSA were passed as a part of
the 73rd Legislature’s Senate Bills 210 (S.B. No. 210) and 211 (S.B.
No. 211).62 These bills were cogs in a larger machination of proposals to
reform the mental health industry.63 The reforms were directed toward
“strengthen[ing the] protection of patients, improv[ing the] quality of
care[,] and severely penaliz[ing] those who violate[d] state laws or
regulations.”64
The 1993 amendments to the TPSA primarily addressed the then
existing statutory language that limited its applicability to healthcare
professionals only.65 After the 1993 amendments, the criminal sanctions
of THSC § 161.091’s subsection (a) were no longer limited to persons
“licensed, certified, or registered by a health care regulatory agency” of
Texas.66 Thereafter, it was a crime for any person to offer to pay or to
agree to accept remuneration for referring or soliciting patient referrals.67
61. See Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 573, § 5.01, secs. 161.091–.094, 1993 Tex.
Gen. Laws 2169, 2169–72, repealed by Act of May 31, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 388, § 6, 1999 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1083, 2440 (removing and modifying several sections of the originally drafted 1991 Act);
see also SENATE INTERIM COMM. ON HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PRIVATE PSYCHIATRIC
SUBSTANCE ABUSE, AND MEDICAL REHABILITATION SERVICES IN TEXAS 66 (1992) [hereinafter
SENATE INTERIM COMM. REPORT] (recommending that the Texas legislature amend the current
statute to address several issues identified, such as prohibiting “any person” from accepting or
offering remuneration); Timmons, supra note 10, at 343–44 (“[T]he legislature passed a myriad of
initiatives designed to address the abuses in the for-profit psychiatric industry.”).
62. Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 706, § 1, secs. 161.091–.094, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws
2769, 2769–73 (repealed 1999).
63. See generally Timmons, supra note 10, at 340–50 (discussing the large reforms that occurred
in the mental health industry including judicial, administrative, and legislative responses to the
abuses).
64. Letter from Senate Interim Comm. on Health & Human Servs. to The Honorable Bob
Bullock, Lieutenant Governor of Texas (Nov. 2, 1992), in SENATE INTERIM COMM. REPORT, supra
note 61. Other major mental health bills passed during the 73rd Regular Session of the Texas
Legislature include Senate Bills 205 and 207. SENATE RESEARCH CTR., THE 73RD TEXAS
LEGISLATURE: SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT LEGISLATION 58 (1993).
65. See S. Comm. on Health & Human Servs., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 211, 73d Leg., R.S.
(1993) (acknowledging the fact that the then current language of the statute only addressed healthrelated professions); SENATE INTERIM COMM. REPORT, supra note 61, at 65–66 (“[A] steady stream
of new allegations have arisen involving individuals who are not regulated by state health care
agencies and thus are not subject to the provisions of current law.”).
66. See Act of May 29, 1993, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2769 (removing the limiting
language from the Act).
67. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 102.001 (West 2012). Part of the reason for this change was
that during the Senate Interim Committee’s public hearings, interviews, and investigations, a steady
stream of allegations built up against individuals who were not regulated by state health care
agencies—“includ[ing] probation officers, ministers, school counselors, [and] private businesses set
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The 1993 amendments also re-designated THSC § 161.091(f) as
§ 161.091(e) to read, “This section shall be construed to permit any payment,
business arrangements, or payments practice permitted by” the AntiKickback Statute and its regulations.68 In other words, the language that
provided certain exceptions to the TPSA was deleted. In its place
language was substituted that permitted those practices that would be
otherwise prohibited by the Anti-Kickback Statute.69 This change from
1991’s limiting and excepting language, to 1993’s permissive language, with
respect to the federal statute,70 had the effect of both accomplishing
SB 211’s purpose of expanding the authority of Texas’s illegal
remuneration law,71 and eliminating (or at least clarifying) the potentially
ambiguous reading of the TPSA.72
The TPSA underwent its final revision in 1999. Pursuant to the Texas
legislature’s major revision process of the 1925 Texas statutory
classification scheme,73 THSC § 161.091 was repealed and re-codified in
the Texas Occupations Code at Chapter 102 (TOC § 102).74 The TPSA
currently remains in force in the Occupations Code with virtually no
substantive changes since the 1993 Amendments.

up to recruit patients”—and thus were not subject to the prohibitions of the TPSA prior to the 1993
amendments. SENATE INTERIM COMM. REPORT, supra note 61, at 66. After the 1993 amendments,
those kinds of actors were also punishable under the TPSA. See OCC. § 102.001 (prohibiting any
remuneration from a person without any limitation to health care professionals).
68. Act of May 29, 1993, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2770 (emphasis added).
69. See S. Comm. on Health & Human Servs., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 211, 73d Leg., R.S.
(1993) (“This bill expands the authority of the existing illegal remuneration law and establishes
penalties for violations of this act.”).
70. THSC § 161.091(f) originally read: “This section shall not be construed to prohibit any
payment, business arrangements, or payments practice not prohibited by 42 U.S.C. Section 1320a7b(b) or any regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.” Act of Aug. 9, 1991, 72nd Leg., 1st C.S., ch.
15, § 5.21, sec. 161.091(f), 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 325, 326 (repealed 1999).
71. S. Comm. on Health & Human Servs., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 211, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
72. For a further discussion of the ambiguity concerning the TPSA see Part II.B.1 infra.
73. See Texas v. W. Pub. Co., 882 F.2d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting the reorganization of
the major statutes then in effect by the Texas legislature in 1925). “The purpose of the [statutory
revision] program [was] to clarify and simplify the statutes and to make the statutes more accessible,
understandable, and usable.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 323.007(a) (West 2013).
74. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 102.001–.054 (West 2012). The 1999 recodification of Texas
Health and Safety Code § 161.091 in the Texas Occupations Code was a set of non-substantive
revisions of statutes “relating to the licensing and regulation of certain professions and business
practices.” TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, REVISOR’S REPORT OCCUPATIONS CODE TITLE 6, 78C1 SMH–
D, 77th Leg., R.S., at i (2000).
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B. Interpreting the Texas Patient Solicitation Act
1.

The Ambiguity

The TPSA has largely gone unobserved in the contemporary health care
market—in legal enforcement, healthcare business practices, and in legal
consultation.75 This is likely due to the fact that the TPSA is susceptible
to an ambiguous reading at TOC § 102.003.76 As mentioned above, the
illegal remuneration prohibitions of § 102.001 are limited in that the TPSA
permits “any payment, business arrangement, or payment practice permitted
by” the Anti-Kickback Statute and its regulations.77 The Anti-Kickback
Statute only prohibits remuneration for the referral of patients whose care
is reimbursable by Federal health care programs.78 It could be reasoned
that, if the Anti-Kickback Statute only prohibits remuneration for referrals
that implicate Federal health care programs, it does not prohibit referral
remuneration arrangements that do not involve Federal health care
programs, such as private insurance and cash payments.
There is a dearth of substantive legal guidance from the Texas courts
and other administrative bodies—which contributes to its perceived
The specious line of reasoning is as follows: the
ambiguity.79
Anti-Kickback Statute permits referral arrangements that do not implicate
Federal health care programs, and the TPSA permits anything that the
Anti-Kickback Statute permits. Thus, the TPSA permits those same
75. Despite the fact that there have been numerous prosecutions, lawsuits, and investigations
that invoke and interpret the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, there has only been one Texas state court
lawsuit that has discussed the Texas TPSA. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the only significant state
court case in Texas analyzing the TPSA); see also Kevin Krause, New Texas Law Seeks to Uncover
Financial Deals Between Pharmacies, Physicians, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Feb. 11, 2016),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2016/02/10/new-texas-law-seeks-to-uncover-financialdeals-between-pharmacies-physicians [https://perma.cc/W7PP-SZTB] (describing physicians
willingness to engage in certain “financial arrangements after being told falsely that they meet state
and federal laws”); Woodruff & Kreick, supra note 21 (“While the Texas Anti-Solicitation Statute has
been in place [at Texas Occupations Code §§102.001–.054] since 1999, a review of recent case law
indicates it rarely has been enforced.”).
76. Formerly Texas Health and Safety Code section 161.091(f) prior to the 1993 amendments,
and Texas Health and Safety Code section 161.091(e) thereafter. Act of Aug. 9, 1991, 72nd Leg., 1st
C.S., ch. 15, § 5.21, sec. 161.091(f), 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 325, 326 (amended 1993) (repealed 1999).
77. OCC. § 102.003 (emphasis added).
78. See supra notes 24–38 and accompanying text.
79. See infra Part II.B.2, II.B.3 (discussing relevant case law and AG Opinions which have
contributed to the perceived ambiguity of the TPSA); see also Woodruff & Kreick, supra note 21
(illustrating the difficulty in understanding enforcement of fraud and abuse matters in healthcare).
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referral arrangements that do not implicate Federal health care
programs.80
Stated differently, this misleading argument provides that because the
Anti-Kickback Statute is silent regarding remuneration-for-referrals
arrangements that do not involve Federal health care programs, the
Anti-Kickback Statute does not prohibit those practices; and because the
Anti-Kickback Statute does not prohibit those practices, by inference
alone, the federal statute permits those same arrangements. Therefore, if
the Anti-Kickback Statute permits remuneration for referrals involving
payors that are not Federal health care programs, the TPSA permits the
very same.81 The Anti-Kickback Statute does not prohibit these kinds of
remuneration schemes, so conclusively the Anti-Kickback Statute must
permit those schemes, thereby permitting those very schemes under the
TPSA.82
The above contention that the TPSA essentially prohibits no further
conduct than the Anti-Kickback Statute has two potential ramifications.
First, at the very least, the TPSA may be interpreted as so overly vague or
ambiguous as to warrant it unenforceable.83 The TPSA prohibits any
80. In Texas, the TPSA follows the Anti-Kickback Statute, prohibiting financial payments and
rewards for patient referrals, and is known as the Texas Anti-Solicitation Act or the Texas Illegal
Remuneration Act. OCC. §§ 102.001–.054. However, as noted above, Texas prohibits “any”
remuneration, while the Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits remunerations in connection with a Federal
health care program. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012) (prohibiting remunerations associated
with referrals that may be paid “in whole or in part under a Federal health care program” (emphasis
added)), with OCC. § 102.001 (prohibiting a person from offering or accepting “any remuneration in
cash or in kind” (emphasis added)).
81. It is necessary to keep in mind that the TPSA permits payment arrangements permitted
under the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute. OCC. § 102.003.
82. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(1)–(2) (containing limitations to federal health care
programs), with OCC. § 102.003 (allowing anything permitted under the federal statute).
83. See Ahearn v. State, 588 S.W.2d 327, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (“A statute is
unconstitutionally vague only if persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application.” (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162
(1972))). For purposes of this article, “unenforceable” shall have the same meaning as
“unconstitutional” when referring to a statute. The analysis for determining whether a statute is
unconstitutional in Texas was clearly laid out in Battles v. State:
When reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, we presume the statute is valid and the
legislature has not acted unreasonably or arbitrarily in enacting the statute. The burden rests on
the party challenging the statute to establish its unconstitutionality. We uphold the statute if we
can determine a reasonable construction which will render it constitutional and carry out the
legislative intent. To pass a vagueness challenge, a criminal statute must give a person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited. Also, the law must
establish determinative guidelines for law enforcement.
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remuneration knowingly provided, solicited, or accepted for patient
referrals in one provision; but, it seemingly excludes the remuneration
arrangements permitted under the Anti-Kickback Statute in another
provision.84 This distinction means that the law may not sufficiently
provide fair notice as to what conduct is made criminal.85 Second, the
TPSA may be construed as attempting to have it both ways: prohibiting
non-Federal health care program remuneration while simultaneously
deferring to the purview and limitations of the Anti-Kickback Statute.
Under this interpretation, the TPSA runs the risk of being declared
preempted by the Anti-Kickback Statute, rendering it unenforceable.86
As mentioned at the outset, this Article contends that the TPSA is valid
and enforceable; however, the TPSA has garnered very little attention and
even less analysis by the courts or under state administrative
consideration.87 Nevertheless, there are several Texas judicial cases and
Texas Attorney General Opinions that evaluate its purpose and
applicability.88 When considered alongside its legislative history and
intent, and with the assistance of insightful case law from other
jurisdictions that have considered the federal-state relationship of illegal

Battles v. State, 45 S.W.3d 694, 702–03 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, no pet.) (citations omitted) (first
citing Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc); then citing Cotton v.
State, 686 S.W.2d 140, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc); then citing Ely v. State, 582 S.W.2d
416, 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); and then citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09
(1972)).
84. Compare OCC. § 102.001 (prohibiting any remuneration), with id. § 102.003 (permitting
anything permitted under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)).
85. See Ahearn, 588 S.W.2d at 338 (requiring statutes to cater to persons of average intelligence
in order to be considered constitutional, ensuring fair notice of what is prohibited); Margraves v.
State, 996 S.W.2d 290, 303 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. granted) (“All criminal laws
must give fair notice to the populace as to what activity is made criminal so that individuals have fair
warning of what is forbidden.” (citing Bynum v. State, 767 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)
(en banc))).
86. See Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 516 U.S. 474, 476 (1996) (per curiam)
(“In a pre-emption case such as this, state law is displaced only ‘to the extent that it actually conflicts
with federal law.’” (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983))).
87. Only two Texas courts and three Attorney General opinions have discussed the TPSA.
Plano Surgery Ctr. v. New You Weight Mgmt. Ctr., 265 S.W.3d 496, 501 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008,
no pet.); New Boston Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, 47 S.W.3d 34, 38–41 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.); Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-95-041 (1995); Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-93-84
(1993); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. DM-138 (1992).
88. See infra, Parts II.B.2, II.B.3.
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remuneration laws, the TPSA’s legitimate enforceability becomes more
apparent.89
2.

Texas Courts

There is only one Texas state case of record that addressed the TPSA as
it appeared when it was codified at THSC § 161.091.90 That case involved
a hospital appealing a decision of the Texas Workforce Commission
regarding the hospital’s former employee, whose contract, the hospital
alleged, was unenforceable for violating the Anti-Kickback Statute and
TPSA.91 The significance of that decision was that it recognized that both
the federal statute and the Texas statute each have exceptions and
safe-harbor provisions that exempted the conduct alleged as illegal.92 The
court ruled that the alleged illegal conduct satisfied the exemptions under
the Anti-Kickback Statute as well as its Safe Harbors93 and was equally
exempted under the TPSA.94 The conduct in question was granted
exemption under the TPSA because it was both: (i) specifically permitted
under the federal statute, thus satisfying THSC § 161.091(f)’s federal law
construction provision,95 and (ii) independently exempted under THSC
§ 161.091(e)’s exemption for marketing and advertising services.96

89. A recent set of federal cases has also considered the TPSA’s applicability and
enforceability in private actions. See infra notes 239–82 and accompanying text.
90. New Boston Gen. Hosp., 47 S.W.3d at 38.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 38–39.
93. See id. at 38 (“[The Anti-Kickback Statute] explicitly exempts an employee and employer
from [the prohibitions of] Subsections (b)(1) & (2) for any amount paid during the existence of a
bona fide employment relationship.” (citing United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp., 938 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D. Tex. 1996), aff’d in part, vacated & remanded in part on
other grounds, 125 F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 1997))).
94. Id. at 39 (identifying the statutory safe harbor provisions for bona fide employee-employer
relationships as an exception to the Texas statute as well (citing Columbia/HCA, 938 F. Supp.
at 403)).
95. See Act of Aug. 9, 1991, 72nd Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 15, § 5.21, sec. 161.091, 1991 Tex. Gen.
Laws 325, 326 (repealed 1999) (“This section shall not be construed to prohibit any payment,
business arrangements, or payments practice not prohibited by 42 U.S.C. Section 1320a-7b(b) or any
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.”).
96. See New Boston Gen. Hosp., 47 S.W.3d at 38–39 (concluding that both statutes provide
exemptions for the type of marketing undertaken by the employee in this case). Prior to the TPSA’s
1993 amendments, the TPSA provided at section 161.091(e) that the TPSA:
[S]hall not be construed to prohibit remuneration for advertising, marketing, or other services
that are provided for the purpose of securing or soliciting patients provided the remuneration is
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Only one other Texas state court case has substantively analyzed the
provisions of the TPSA.97 Therein, the court briefly addressed a similar
argument as above—whether a contract was unenforceable because it
violated the TPSA.98 The court briefly examined the same marketing and
advertising exemption under the statute, found that the contract fit within
the exemption, and proceeded to consider other legal issues without any
further analysis of the TPSA.99
Aside from the Texas state court cases, several federal district courts in
Texas have, in varying degrees, considered the TPSA.100 DAC Surgical
Partners v. United Healthcare,101 stands out among these cases, as it is the
one rare case comparing the purview of the TPSA with that of the
Anti-Kickback Statute.102 In DAC Surgical, dozens of physician-owned
professional associations (PAs) filed suit against the insurance company
United Healthcare for wrongfully refusing to pay millions of dollars in
“facility fees” for surgeries the physician owners of the PAs performed for
United Healthcare’s insured at a Houston Ambulatory Surgical Center

set in advance, is consistent with the fair market value of the services, and is not based on the
volume or value of any patient referrals or business otherwise generated between the parties.
Act of Aug. 9, 1991, § 5.21, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws at 326.
97. Plano Surgery Ctr. v. New You Weight Mgmt. Ctr., 265 S.W.3d 496, 501 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2008, no pet.).
98. Id. at 500.
99. In this civil suit for breach of contract among private persons, the defendant argued on
appeal that the contract on which the suit was based violated the TPSA, “making the arrangement
illegal and unenforceable.” Id. at 501. Determining that illegality of contract is an affirmative
defense; the court ruled that the defendant waived the defense by not presenting evidence of it at
trial. Id. at 501–02 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 94; MJR Corp. v. B & B Vending Co., 760 S.W.2d 4, 22
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied)). Nevertheless, the court decided that the contract here, a
letter of intent, was not facially illegal by the defendant paying the plaintiff “for ‘marketing services’
not involving the securing or soliciting of patients other than through advertising permitted by
[TOC] section 102.004.” Id. at 502.
100. See, e.g., Koenig v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 4:13–CV–0359, 2015 WL 6554347, at *7
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2015) (“Aetna contends that NCMC’s ‘prompt pay discount program’ violates
state law, particularly §§ 101.201, 102.003 of the Texas Occupations Code, on the basis that NCMC
engaged in false, misleading or deceptive advertising.”). This Article discusses federal cases analyzing
the TPSA below. See Part III.A.1, infra.
101. DAC Surgical Partners v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., No. 4:11-CV-1355, 2016 WL
7177881, slip op. (S.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2016).
102. See id. at *14 (“The Federal Anti-Kickback Statute is similar to the Texas Patient
Solicitation Act but applies only to referrals for services paid by federal health care programs, not by
private insurers such as [Defendant].” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012))).
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(ASC).103 United Healthcare raised counterclaims against the PAs and
their physician owners.104
In DAC Surgical, the PAs entered into facility use agreements in which
the PAs would perform surgeries at the ASC and would be entitled to 50%
of the facility fees that the ASC collected from insurers such as United
Healthcare.105 United Healthcare alleged that the PAs were merely “shell
United
companies” who were not licensed surgical facilities.106
Healthcare claimed that the use agreements with the ASC served the sole
purpose of funneling kickbacks to the physician owners of the PAs in
exchange for scheduling their surgical procedures at the ASC.107
United Healthcare sought declaratory judgment that the PAs’ facility
fee-sharing (use) agreements were void based on their illegality, thus
relieving United Healthcare of liability for the PAs’ claims.108 Among
those Texas laws that United Healthcare alleged the PAs had violated in
their use agreements was the TPSA.109 In a succinct comparison of the
TPSA and the Anti-Kickback Statute, the court observed that both laws
are similar to each other, but that the federal statute “applies only to
referrals for services paid by federal health care programs, not by private
insurers.”110
In this brief consideration, the federal court analyzed the Anti-Kickback
Statute alongside the TPSA. The court cursorily, but specifically,
acknowledged that the federal law is different from the TPSA, in that the
federal law is limited to Federal health care programs and the TPSA is
not.111 Currently, this court’s analysis is the only one to intimate that the
TPSA does, in fact, prohibit referrals involving kickbacks irrespective of
the source of funds, whereas the Anti-Kickback Statute is limited to those
affecting Federal health care programs.
103. Id. at *2–3.
104. United Healthcare’s counterclaims included additional professional organizations and
physicians. Id. at *2.
105. Id.
106. Id. at *3.
107. Id. at *5.
108. Id. at *14 (“United seeks two declaratory judgments that are based on both the public
policy in Texas that a party cannot recover for claims that arise from its own illegal or fraudulent
conduct and plan provisions, namely that: (1) United is not liable for any of the pending charges for
facility fees for services provided at [the ASC]; and (2) that the [use agreements] that the [PAs]
entered into with [the ASC] are void ab initio.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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Texas Attorney General Considerations

The Texas Attorney General (AG) Opinions provide slightly better
guidance regarding the construction and disposition of the TPSA.112
Unfortunately, the AG Opinions’ consideration of the TPSA’s applicability
to Federal health care programs varies among the different attorneys
general.113 The variance, however, seems to align with the changes in
language of the TPSA’s construction provisions. The AGs’ analyses of the
TPSA’s relation to Federal health care programs vacillate as the language
referencing the Anti-Kickback Statute changed.
The first AG Opinion evaluating the prohibitions of the TPSA came in
1992.114 There, the AG responded to a hospital’s inquiry of whether it
could compensate on-call physicians who admit emergency room patients
with a flat fee or a per diem fee without violating the TPSA.115 The AG
determined that this kind of arrangement was exempted from criminal
liability under the Anti-Kickback Statute as satisfying one of the Safe
Harbors.116 The AG concluded that because the arrangement was
exempted from criminal liability under the federal statute, it was also
exempted under the TPSA by virtue of then THSC § 161.091(f), which
provided that the TPSA “shall not be construed to prohibit any
payment . . . not prohibited by” the Anti-Kickback Statute or its
regulations.117
112. Despite the fact that in construing a criminal statute, administrative construction, such as
Texas AG Opinions, may have little persuasive influence on a court evaluating the express meaning
of the legislature, a court may nonetheless consider such administrative construction of a statute.
Compare Shires v. State, 191 S.W.2d 475, 476 (Tex. Crim. App. 1945) (per curiam) (“In construing a
criminal statute . . . administrative construction may have but little, if any, persuasive force in
reaching a judicial conclusion as to the express meaning of the legislature.”), with TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 311.023(6) (West 2013) (allowing a court to consider administrative construction, among
other things, in construing a facially ambiguous statute).
113. Compare Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-95-041 (1995) (exempting arrangements that satisfy the
regulations promulgated under the Anti-Kickback Statute as specifically permitted under the THSC),
with Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-93-84 (1993) (“This provision is intended to prohibit only payments,
business arrangements, and payments practices prohibited by the anti-kickback provision of the
Medicare law, and regulations promulgated thereunder.”).
114. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. DM-138 (1992).
115. Id.
116. Id. The AG, however, explained that it was beyond the purview of the AG Opinion
process to review the particulars of any contract to determine whether it satisfies specific statutory
requirements. Id. The AG spoke more in hypotheticals, e.g., “[a]ssuming . . . the contracts are as you
describe them,” in order to surmise that the contracts would be exempted from criminal liability
under the federal statute’s Safe Harbors. Id.
117. Id.
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This AG Opinion appears to construe the “not prohibited” provision of
the pre-1993 amendments of THSC § 161.091(f) to mean “permitted.”
Additionally, the AG specifically identifies a Safe Harbor of the
Anti-Kickback Statute and uses that specific Safe Harbor as the exempted
conduct under THSC § 161.091.118 In addition, the AG describes the
prohibitions under the Anti-Kickback Statute as “criminaliz[ing] kickbacks
in Medicare and federally-funded state health care programs.”119 Yet the
AG broadly describes the TPSA as “prohibit[ing] health care professionals
from accepting remuneration for securing or soliciting patients or
patronage” with no mention of Federal health care programs.120 This
abstention from categorizing the Texas statute as a prohibition of
referrals-for-remuneration schemes implicating Federal health care
programs may ultimately prove instructive on whether the TPSA is
enforceable.
The next AG Opinion, in 1993, similarly categorized the TPSA broadly,
stating that it “prohibits licensed health care personnel from giving or
receiving illegal remuneration.”121 The opinion continues, however,
explaining, “This provision is intended to prohibit only payments, business
arrangements, and payments practices prohibited by the anti-kickback
provision of the Medicare law, and regulations promulgated
thereunder.”122 This observation seems to intimate that the prohibitions
of the TPSA only concern the same prohibitions of the federal statute or
its regulations.123 The AG’s language here thus supports the potential for
an ambiguous reading of the TPSA.
The AG wrongly asserted that the regulations promulgated under the
As previously
Anti-Kickback Statute prohibit certain conduct.124
discussed, the OIG itself has clearly specified that the Safe Harbor
118. See id. (“Assuming . . . that the contracts . . . do not ‘involve the counseling or promotion
of a business arrangement or other activity that violates any state or federal law,’ then persons making
payments under such contracts are exempted from criminal liability . . . .” (citations omitted) (quoting
42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d)(6) (2015))). The reader should keep in mind that the Safe Harbors are
defined as “payment practices [that] shall not be treated as a criminal offense” under the AntiKickback Statute. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2015).
119. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. DM-138 (1992).
120. Id.
121. Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-93-84 (1993).
122. Id.
123. See id. (furthering the potential misconception of the TPSA by emphasizing that the AntiKickback Statute criminalizes remunerations in connection with services paid under Medicare).
124. Id.
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regulations do not prohibit any conduct.125 The AG’s intimation here not
only misconstrued the purpose of the Safe Harbor regulations, but, in the
process, developed misconceived administrative guidance regarding the
construction provision of the TPSA. The AG possibly contributed to any
perceived or potential ambiguity in the Texas statute.
It is important to emphasize that this 1993 AG Opinion was published
prior to the enactment of the 1993 amendments.126 Therefore, a proper
statutory analysis cannot summarily dismiss this AG’s direct
contextualizing of the TPSA in terms of Federal health care programs,
particularly considering that its conclusion may very well be the genesis of
an ambiguous interpretation of the TPSA. But, considering this AG
Opinion was decided prior to the 1993 amendments and misconstrues the
purpose of the federal Safe Harbor regulations, this AG’s conclusions
cannot be considered dispositive either.
An AG Opinion from 1995 may arguably be the most significant and
germane of its kind in developing an understanding of the TPSA.127
Unfortunately, while proving instructive, it also remains as incomplete and
unsatisfying as other administrative guidance on the TPSA.128 The 1995
AG Opinion addresses the question of whether the TPSA prohibits a
physician from investing in, and referring patients to, a business entity
“that offers monitoring services to high risk obstetrical patients.”129
Once again, the AG distinguishes the Texas and federal illegal
remuneration statutes by disregarding any reference to Federal health care
programs when discussing the TPSA.130 Meanwhile, the opinion
describes the Anti-Kickback Statute’s prohibitions as “generally
criminaliz[ing] kickbacks in Medicare and federally-funded state health care
125. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
126. The 1993 amendments changed the “not prohibited” language of THSC
section 161.091(f) to the “permitted” language of THSC section 161.091(e), and the current
construction provision at TOC section 102.003. Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 573, § 5.01,
sec. 161.091(f), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2169, 2170 (repealed 1999).
127. See Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-95-041 (1995) (considering the role a physician may have in “a
business entity that offers certain health care services”).
128. There are various other AG Opinions in which the TPSA was at least mentioned but not
considered in any worthwhile or related manner. See Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-94-001 (1994) (concluding
there were not enough facts to conclude whether the acts in question ran afoul of the TPSA); Tex.
Att’y Gen. DM-276 (1993) (referring to the TPSA to conclude there was no liability without a
thorough analysis).
129. Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-95-041 (1995).
130. See id. (assuming the acts in question ran afoul of the Texas statute although there was no
reference to a Federal health care program).
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programs.”131 The business arrangements in question in the 1995 AG
Opinion involved physicians referring their patients to a monitoring
company in which the physicians were investors.132 “[T]he monitoring
company [did] not directly furnish the monitoring equipment and services,
[but it did] receive payments from the patient or third-party payor, such as
the patient’s health insurance company.”133
Despite expressly acknowledging that liability under the Anti-Kickback
Statute required implicating a Federal health care program, the 1995
opinion was notably silent on such requirement when analyzing the
TPSA.134 The AG contributed to the inadequacy of valuable analysis of
the TPSA, however, by concluding that the petitioners here did not
provide adequate information to determine whether their business
arrangement satisfied the exemptions or safe harbors of the Texas or
federal statutes.135
Nevertheless, the AG acknowledged that the monitoring company
appeared to violate the TPSA “by providing an investment return to the
physicians who refer the patients to the company.”136 This interpretation
may indirectly acknowledge that an illegal remuneration scheme that
involves private payors (rather than Federal health care programs) may
violate the TPSA. The 1995 opinion concludes that “an investment
arrangement that satisfies certain federal regulations may be exempt from the
prohibition set forth in [the TPSA].”137 The AG intimates that if a
remuneration scheme constitutes specifically protected conduct under the
Safe Harbors—as opposed to merely qualifying as unspecified
non-prohibited conduct (as the pre-1993 amendments of THSC
§ 161.091(f) and the 1993 AG Opinion, above,138 possibly
contemplate)—then such a scheme may be exempt from criminal liability
under the TPSA.139
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. The monitoring services company in which the referring physicians were investors,
“contract[ed] with a second company to provide the monitoring equipment and services to the
[referred] patients.” Id.
134. See id. (lacking any reference to a Federal health care program requirement in the analysis
of the potential violation).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. See supra notes 121–26 and accompanying text.
139. Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-95-041 (1995).
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Case Law from Other Jurisdictions

Like Texas, many states have enacted their own state-level illegal
remuneration statutes.140 Several state statutes specifically implicate
Federal health care programs, and some simply mirror the federal
statute.141 Among those states, there are two leading state-level cases that
discuss their respective state’s statutes with regard to the Anti-Kickback
Statute.142 Though these cases specifically considered whether their
respective state law was preempted by the Anti-Kickback Statute, their
legal analysis is relevant to understanding whether the TPSA is
enforceable. Specifically, these state court analyses of federal preemption
provide a better understanding of what the purpose and bounds of the
Anti-Kickback Statute are with respect to state counterparts. These cases
further demonstrate what conduct is prohibited under the federal statute
and the reasoning behind those prohibitions.143
The first case, State v. Harden,144 was decided in the Florida State
Supreme Court in 2006. There, ten individuals were engaged in a “pay for
patients” arrangement with three corporate entities that provided dental
services to children.145 The alleged misconduct involved individuals
soliciting Medicaid-eligible children and driving them to the corporate
entities for dental treatment in exchange for a payment per each child that
was treated.146 The defendants argued “that the payment of wages by a
Medicaid provider to its employees for the solicitation and transportation
of Medicaid-eligible children to dental facilities for treatment was expressly
protected by” the Anti-Kickback Statute and the Safe Harbors
thereunder.147 The defendants thus posited that Florida’s attempt to
prosecute activity expressly protected under federal statute was
unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.148
140. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:438.2 (2015) (providing similar provisions to that of the
TPSA, along with specifically enumerated safe harbors, and language recognizing “[a]ny other ‘safe
harbor’ exception created by federal or state law or by rule”).
141. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 52, at 6–7 (explaining the several approaches states may
take in promulgating state illegal remuneration statutes).
142. People v. Guiamelon, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 584, 593–96 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Harden,
938 So. 2d 480, 486–93 (Fla. 2006).
143. See infra notes 211–15 and accompanying text.
144. State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2006).
145. Id. at 484.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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The challenged Florida statute (Florida Kickback Statute) under which
the defendants were charged made it unlawful to “[k]nowingly solicit,
offer, pay, or receive any remuneration . . . in return for referring an
individual to a person for the furnishing . . . of any item or service for
which payment may be made . . . under the Medicaid program.”149 The
Florida court held that the Florida Kickback Statute was preempted by the
Anti-Kickback Statute under a conflict preemption theory.150 Under this
theory “it is impossible to comply with both the state and federal
regulations or where state law is an obstacle to accomplishing the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.”151 The court determined the
Florida Kickback Statute: (i) allowed “a lower mens rea element[,] which
permit[ted a state] anti-kickback violation based on negligent behavior,”
and (ii) possessed no exceptions or safe harbors.152 Consequently, the
court held that the Florida Kickback Statute criminalized conduct that the
Anti-Kickback Statute “specifically intended to be lawful and shielded
from prosecution.”153
The Florida Court made several key observations regarding federal law,
specifically with respect to the Anti-Kickback Statute. First, there is a
“presumption against federal pre-emption of a state statute designed to
foster public health [and that presumption] has special force when it
appears . . . that the two governments are pursuing common
purposes.”154 Second, “Congress was concerned that the [Anti-Kickback
Statute] was so broad that ‘some relatively innocuous commercial
arrangements were technically covered by the statute and therefore were
subject to criminal prosecution.’”155 This was essentially why Congress
added the knowing and willful mens rea standards and directed the OIG to

149. Id. at 490 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 409.920(2)(e) (2000)).
150. See id. at 493 (“[T]he Florida anti-kickback statute is preempted because it presents an
obstacle to the accomplishments of the purposes of the federal law.”).
151. Id. at 490 (citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)).
152. Id. at 491, 492.
153. Id. at 492–93.
154. Id. at 486 (quoting Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 646 (2003)).
The Anti-Kickback Statute was “primarily concerned with outlawing health care referrals that were
considered unethical or inappropriate.” Id. at 487 (citing Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419 (1972)).
155. Id. at 492 (quoting Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse;
Clarification of the Initial OIG Safe Harbor Provisions and Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor
Provisions Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. 63518, 63518 (Nov. 19, 1999) (codified at
42 C.F.R. pt. 1001)).
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promulgate the Safe Harbors.156 The Florida Kickback Statute’s lower
mens rea, and lack of exceptions and safe harbors, meant that it stood “as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objective of Congress.”157 The court, therefore, found that the Florida
statute was preempted based on an obstacle preemption theory.158
The second case, People v. Guiamelon,159 took place in the California
Court of Appeals in 2012, with a similar set of facts to those of Harden.160
In Guiamelon, the defendant, a pediatric physician, was approached by
marketers claiming they could help her increase her client base.161 The
defendant engaged the marketers to bring patients by driving or directing
them to her office.162 She paid the marketers $20 for each referred
patient who qualified for, and actually enrolled in, a Federal health care
program.163 She was convicted for offering rebates for patient referrals in
violation of California’s Business and Professions Code (California
Kickback Statute).164
On appeal, the defendant challenged the conviction, contending that the
California Kickback Statute was preempted by the Anti-Kickback
Statute.165 She posited an obstacle preemption theory, arguing that the
California Kickback Statute interfered with Congress’s “objective of
providing health care services to the underserved.”166 The defendant’s
argument maintained that the California Kickback Statute was preempted

156. State v. Rubio, 967 So. 2d 768, 773 (Fla. 2007) (citing State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480,
487–89 (Fla. 2006)).
157. Harden, 938 So. 2d at 485 (quoting State v. Harden, 873 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004)).
158. Id. at 495.
159. People v. Guiamelon, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 584 (Ct. App. 2012).
160. Compare id. at 589 (discussing how Guiamelon, a licensed physician, paid marketers for
each referred patient who qualified for, and enrolled in, a federal health care program), with Harden,
938 So. 2d at 484 (describing alleged misconduct involving “the payment of wages by a Medicaid
provider to its employees for the solicitation and transportation of Medicaid-eligible children”).
161. Guiamelon, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 589.
162. Id.
163. Id. It is worth noting that the physician-defendant was a provider for various
government health care programs for the poor, “treat[ing] primarily low-income Spanish-speaking
patients.” Id. Prior to engaging the marketers, she tried to increase her client base through seemingly
innocuous marketing measures, including flier distribution, billboards, and health fairs. Id.
164. Id. at 590.
165. Id. at 588.
166. Id. at 588–89.
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specifically because it punished negligent and inadvertent conduct, which
was allowed under the Anti-Kickback Statute.167
Unlike the Florida Kickback Statute, but similar to the TPSA, the
California Kickback Statute’s prohibitions do not consider whether a
Federal health care program was implicated.168 Like Texas, California
prohibits a broader base of activity—seemingly any remuneration for
patient referrals.169 The California appellate court determined that the
California Kickback Statute was enacted to “ensure that referrals would
not be induced by considerations other than the best interest of the
patient” and to “prevent patients being charged more for treatment
because of an additional hidden fee imposed to recoup payment for
securing the referral.”170 The court found that the purpose of the
California Kickback Statute was consistent with that of the Anti-Kickback
Statute—“to prohibit and punish payment for referrals to medical
providers.”171 The defendant’s obstacle preemption claim consequently
failed.
Of particular importance to our analysis here was the California court’s
discussion of its own state case law regarding obstacle preemption, to wit,
the idea of state law prohibiting what federal law permits.172 In discussing
whether obstacle preemption exists simply because a state statute prohibits
what the federal law permits, the court borrowed a line of reasoning from
a prior case of similar legal subject matter.173 In that prior case, the
appellants argued that a California penal statute prohibiting the

167. Id. at 604. The Anti-Kickback Statute requires a willful or knowing scienter, a higher
mens rea standards than negligence. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012).
168. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.920(2)(a) (West 2013) (prohibiting remuneration in
connection with a Medicaid program), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 650 (West 2017) (making no
reference to any Federal health care program), and TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 102.001 (West 2012)
(prohibiting any remuneration with no limitation to Federal health care programs).
169. Guiamelon, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 595 (“Section 650 . . . makes it unlawful for any physician
to offer ‘any rebate, refund, commission, preference, patronage dividend, discount, or other
consideration, whether in the form of money or otherwise, as compensation or inducement for
referring patients, clients, or customers to any person . . . .’” (emphasis added) (quoting CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 650(a) (West 2012))).
170. Id. (quoting 65 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. 252 (1982)).
171. Id. at 604.
172. Id. (citing Viva! Int’l Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc.,
162 P.3d 569, 575 (Cal. 2007); Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 95 P.3d 422, 454 (Cal. 2004)).
173. See generally Viva! Int’l Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc.,
162 P.3d 569, 583 (Cal. 2007) (“So too here: federal law does not prohibit importation of kangaroo
products, while state law does. That arrangement poses no obstacle to current federal policy.”).
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importation or sale of kangaroo products within California was preempted
by federal law, which neither prohibited nor authorized such
importations.174 In other words, the party arguing for preemption
contended that state law prohibited what federal law permitted, and the
state law was therefore preempted.175 In rejecting this argument, the
court concluded that “[t]here is a difference between . . . not making an
activity unlawful, and . . . making that activity lawful,” and that “it is more
accurate to characterize the state statute as prohibiting . . . what the federal
[regulation] does not prohibit.”176 Federal law did not prohibit the
importation of kangaroo products, while California law did.177
Consequently, the state law prohibiting importation and sale of kangaroo
products posed no obstacle to federal policy and was not preempted by
federal law.178
Employing similar principles, the Guiamelon court held that the
California Kickback Statute’s prohibition of the arrangement between the
physician and marketers, and the physician’s subsequent conviction, did
not pose an obstacle to federal policy.179 The fact that the California
statute punished conduct that was not prohibited under the federal statute
(negligent or unintentional, rather than knowing or willful, conduct), did
not form a basis for obstacle preemption.180 The court held that the
purpose of the California Kickback Statute was consistent with the Federal
Anti-Kickback Statute.181
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 582–83.
Id. at 583 (citing Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 95 P.3d 422, 454 (Cal. 2004)).
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bronco, 95 P.3d at 454).
Id. at 582.
Id. at 583. The court in Viva! reasoned:

The key here is the meaning of the word “authorized” . . . . The trial court and Court of
Appeal[s] viewed a “failure to prohibit” as equivalent to “authorization.” But if that were so,
there would be no room for state regulation, despite an evident federal intention that there be
significant room for such regulation. Either an action would be prohibited by federal law, in
which case state regulation would be superfluous, or it would not be prohibited by federal law,
in which case state regulation would be preempted (in these courts’ views). . . . Instead, every
action falls within one of three possible federal categories. An action may be prohibited, it may
be authorized, or it may be neither prohibited nor authorized.
Id. Under this third category (neither prohibited nor authorized under federal law), the court
reasoned that there was free room for the state to regulate the conduct. Id.
179. People v. Guiamelon, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 584, 604 (Ct. App. 2012).
180. See id. (“[T]he fact that a state statute punishes conduct not prohibited by federal law is
not a basis for obstacle preemption.”).
181. Id.
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C. Coalescing the Interpretations and Addressing Enforceability
The analysis in the previous section of this Article focused on the effect
and breadth of the Texas and federal illegal remuneration statutes.182 This
section is intended to focus on what activity the TPSA, in fact, addresses,
and what conduct it proscribes. The prior examination of legal authorities
in both Texas and foreign jurisdictions additionally demonstrated that the
TPSA is not a piece of perfunctory and toothless legislation.183 Although
perhaps presently obscured in shadows, the TPSA is a potentially
formidable piece of legislation capable of catching the unwary physician
off guard and unprotected.
Until there is better, more definitive judicial consideration and a canon
of reliable case law interpreting the TPSA, the interpretations of the TPSA
will remain ambiguous and likely specious. A close perusal of the
legislative records surrounding the implementation and amendments of
the TPSA, however, assists in providing a more precise perspective of
what the TPSA is intended to prohibit. And to the prudent practitioner
and diligent counselor, a familiarity with the legislative intent also
illustrates how effective a tool the statute would be for the Texas AG’s
office in pursuing criminal charges against physicians for engaging in
remuneration-for-patient-referrals schemes.
The broad language of the TPSA, the seemingly muddled collection of
Texas AG Opinions, and the paucity of meaningful analysis by the courts
all contribute to the potential for physicians and their attorneys to
mistakenly apprehend the TPSA as ineffectual, ambiguous, or
unenforceable. Furthermore, the fact that the Texas AG has simply not
utilized this statute to prosecute very many violators, if any, weakens the
threat of the TPSA’s proscriptions.184 Additionally problematic, is the
fact that if a court were required to analyze whether the TPSA is
enforceable, criminal statutes must be strictly construed against the
government seeking to enforce it.185 Attorneys armed with knowledge

182. See supra Part II.B.
183. See supra, Part II.B.2, II.B.3.
184. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
185. See Townsend v. State, 427 S.W.2d 55, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (“[P]enal statutes are to
be construed strictly in favor of the accused . . . .”); State v. Johnson, 198 S.W.3d 795, 797 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. granted) (“Unless found in the Texas Penal Code, a penal statute must
be strictly construed.” (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Granado, 302 F.3d 421, 424
(5th Cir. 2002), superseded by statute on other grounds, TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 502.409(a)(6)–(7)
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that a prosecutor must assail a strict construction of the statute might
proceed less cautiously when advising their clients of the risks of
participating in conduct prohibited by the TPSA.
Nevertheless, when construing a criminal statute, the Texas courts must
consider the statute’s context and subject matter and, if possible, discern
the legislative intent.186 Therefore, upon a reasonable argument that the
TPSA is ambiguous on its face, a court will have the opportunity to
analyze and consider the legislative intent and history of the TPSA in
construing and applying the statute.187 A court may only stray from the
strict letter of the law, however, when there is ambiguity in the statute’s
wording.188
The wording at TOC § 102.003, stating that “Section 102.001 permits
any payment, business arrangement, or payment practice permitted by [the
Anti-Kickback Statute and its regulations,]” is clearly the source of the
potential ambiguity in the TPSA.189 The attractive, but erroneous,
(current version at TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 502.475))), aff’d, 219 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007).
186. Cf. McLeod v. State, 180 S.W. 117, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1915) (analyzing an ambiguous
statute regarding the definition of “charged” in a criminal statute). The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals analyzed: “[W]e must take into consideration the entire provision and ascertain the intent of
the Legislature in the use of the word, taking into consideration the context and subject matter, and,
if the intent can be ascertained, it must govern over the literal import of the words . . . .” Id. (citing
Brooks v. Hicks, 20 Tex. 666, 667 (1858); Ex parte Robinson, 29 Tex. Ct. App. 186, 187 (1890);
Barkley v. State, 28 Tex. Ct. App. 99, 100–01 (1889); Rigby v. State, 27 Tex. Ct. App. 55, 56–57
(1889); Sartain v. State, 10 Tex. Ct. App. 651, 653 (1881); Albrecht v. State, 8 Tex. Ct. App. 314, 314–
15 (1880); Walker v. State, 7 Tex. Ct. App. 245, 257 (1879)).
187. Cf. Ex parte Peede, 170 S.W. 749, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914) (Harper, J., on motion for
rehearing) (“The history of contemporaneous legislation, as well as legislative debates, may in rare
instances be resorted to and considered by courts in searching for the meaning of a law when the
meaning is obscure, and in discovering the evils intended to be remedied when those evils are in
doubt or unknown.” (quoting Van Winkle v. State, 91 A. 385, 397 (Del. 2014))); Ex parte Roquemore,
131 S.W. 1101, 1104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1910) (“[I]t is a rule of construction well known that, in
undertaking to fix and place meaning upon statutes, we should do so in light of contemporaneous
history, and in reference to the habits and activities of our people.”); Williams v. State, 107 S.W.
1121, 1125 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908) (providing courts with the rule of statutory construction that
legislative intent may be discerned by contemporaneous legislation and irreconcilable conflicts in
other rules (citing Ex parte Neal, 83 S.W. 831, 831–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1904); Ex parte Keith,
83 S.W. 683, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1904))).
188. See Sparks v. State, 174 S.W. 351, 352 (1915) (“This court has held that it is only when a
statute is ambiguous by its terms that courts may rightfully exercise the power of controlling its
language, so as to give effect to what they may suppose to have been the intention of the
lawmakers.”).
189. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 102.003 (West 2012). For further discussion regarding this
potential ambiguity, see supra Part II.B.1.
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interpretation of this provision, is that it nullifies any argument that the
TPSA prohibits referral schemes involving all payors—including private
insurers and cash payments—rather than government payors alone. The
argument is simply that the TPSA unequivocally permits what the
Anti-Kickback Statute permits. The Anti-Kickback Statute inarguably
does not prohibit referral arrangements not invoking Federal health care
program business.190 Because the federal statute is not concerned with
referrals-for-remuneration schemes not affecting Federal health care
programs—such as cash payments or commercial payors—under this
interpretation, the TPSA would be equally unconcerned with such
schemes.
The rationale for finding ambiguity in the TPSA is alluring but clearly
erroneous. Concluding that the TPSA permits what the federal statute
permits requires the conclusion that the TPSA is equally unconcerned
with, and does not prohibit, referral arrangements that do not affect
Federal health care programs. The language of the TPSA’s construction
provision may allow for such a specious ambiguity argument, but its
legislative history is threaded with insight into a contrary legislative intent.
In spite of the TPSA’s clearly self-imposed limitations, permitting
activity that the Anti-Kickback Statute itself permits,191 the most
prominent evidence of the TPSA’s intent not to be restricted to
reimbursements made under Federal health care programs is the consistent
silence on that very matter throughout the TPSA’s life. Over the course of
the TPSA’s inception, implementation, amendment, and consideration by
authoritative governmental bodies, the absence of any acknowledgment of
the TPSA being limited to Federal health care program business should
demonstrably evince the legislative intent.192 In neither the current or
previous codified versions of the TPSA, nor any of the bills introducing or
amending it, is Medicare, Medicaid, TriCare, or any other Federal health
care program discussed as a part of the TPSA’s purview.193 The

190. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(1) & (2) (2012) (requiring such remunerations to be in
connection with a Federal health care program).
191. OCC. § 102.003.
192. The notable exception would be the 1993 Texas AG Opinion previously discussed. See
supra notes 121–26 and accompanying text.
193. See generally OCC. § 102.001; Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 573, § 5.01, secs.
161.091–.02, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2169 (repealed 1999); Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch.
706, § 1, secs. 161.091–.094, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2769 (repealed 1999); Act of Aug. 9, 1991, 72nd
Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 15, § 5.21, sec. 161.091, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 325 (repealed 1999).
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respective legislative bill analyses performed by the Texas House and
Senate Committees for each bill did not yield a consideration of Federal
health care programs in their reviews and synopses of the TPSA—and
they certainly did not consider Federal health care programs as a limitation
on the TPSA’s applicability.194 Rather, those analyses reaffirm the notion
that the TPSA prohibits any remuneration arrangements for patient
referrals.195
The 1993 amendments stand out as greater evidence of the legislature’s
intent to endow the TPSA with wider reach than the Anti-Kickback
Statute. The goal of SB 211 was to expand the authority of the TPSA.196
The 73rd Texas Legislature intended to eliminate language within the
TPSA that (1) limited the application of the statute only to violators who
were health care professionals (as opposed to any person violating the
TPSA),197 and (2) made exceptions to the TPSA’s prohibitions.198
During Senate Committee Hearings on, among other bills, SB 210 and
SB 211, the then current Texas AG, Dan Morales, provided witness
testimony that his office had a growing concern for psychiatric care
providers’ nefarious business tactics and patient abuses done “with the
objective of . . . maximizing opportunities to gain access to public and

194. See generally S. Comm. on Health & Human Servs., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 210, 73d Leg.,
R.S. (1993); H. Comm. on Pub. Health, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 210, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993); H. Comm.
on Appropriations, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 7, 72nd Leg., 1st C.S. (1991).
195. See, e.g., H. Comm. on Appropriations, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 7, 72nd Leg., 1st C.S.
(1991) (indicating that a violation is made out when there is an offer to pay or acceptance of payment
for any referral, without any reference to merely those involving Federal health care programs).
196. See S. Comm. on Health & Human Servs., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 211, 73d Leg., R.S.
(1993) (“As proposed, [SB 211] expands the authority of the illegal remuneration law and provides
penalties for violations of this Act.”).
197. See id. (conforming the TPSA to address allegations of non-healthcare professional
violations, making it a violation for any person to offer or accept a remuneration prohibited by the
statute); see also Texas Patient Solicitation Act: Hearings on Tex. S.B. 211 Before the S. Comm. on
Health & Human Servs., 73d Leg., R.S. (Mar. 16, 1993) (tape available from Texas State Library and
Archives Commission) (“Senate Bill 211 relates to illegal remuneration, and, basically, it expands the
law, which currently makes remuneration illegal for purposes of securing patients and prohibits the
making or accepting of a payment by mental health providers—expands that law to make
remuneration for patients illegal, period. We are prohibiting the payment of securing patients,
period.”).
198. See S. Comm. on Health & Human Servs., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 210, 73d Leg., R.S.
(1993) (“Delet[ing] existing language providing certain exceptions to the act; permit[ing] payments,
business arrangements and payment practices permitted by related federal statutes.”).
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private insurance funds.”199 If nothing more, Mr. Morales’s testimony
intimates the Texas AG’s office was concerned, at least leading up to the
1993 amendments, about health care practices that potentially abused both
public and private health care fund sources.200 The 1993 amendments,
themselves, remain a steadfast defense against misapprehensions that the
TPSA is so ambiguous as to be unenforceable. The 1993 amendments
also help dispel erroneous assertions that the TPSA does not prohibit
remuneration schemes involving reimbursements other than Federal
health care programs.201
The distinction drawn in the previous section of this Article, between
Congress not making an activity unlawful as opposed to making the same
activity lawful,202 applies directly to how we may construe the TPSA.
Considering the possibly varying interpretations of the TPSA among the
different Texas AG Opinions, the significance of the difference between
not making an activity unlawful and making that activity lawful becomes
much more evident.
A person cannot be expected to be criminally liable for engaging in
conduct that is unlawful under a state’s statute that Congress has explicitly
exempted from culpability in a federal statute.203 As observed in the
199. Texas Patient Solicitation Act: Hearings on Tex. S.B. 211 Before the S. Comm. on Health
& Human Servs., 73d Leg., R.S. (Mar. 16, 1993) (statement of Attorney General Morales) (tape
available from Texas State Library and Archives Commission).
200. See id. (“Our investigation disclosed a course of activity on the part of major psychiatric
care providers involving prescription of unnecessary, excessive and in some instances, forcible
psychiatric care . . . all of this with the objective of . . . maximizing opportunities to gain access to
public and private insurance funds.”).
201. E.g., third-party private insurance or cash payments.
202. See supra notes 172–81 and accompanying text.
203. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (“[I]t has been settled that
state law that conflicts with federal law is ‘without effect.’ . . . In the absence of an express
congressional command [of federal preemption], state law is pre-empted if that law actually conflicts
with federal law . . . .” (first citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); and then citing
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. St. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983)));
De Maio Farms & Ranches, Inc. v. Hereford Veterinary Supply, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-00233-J, 2015 WL
12731758, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2015) (illustrating two forms of preemption, including express
and conflict preemption (first citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000);
and then citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516)); Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Oney, 380 S.W.3d 795, 809 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (“The intent to preempt state law may be explicitly stated
in statutory language or implicit in a statute’s structure and purpose. Implied preemption can be
based on field preemption or conflict preemption.” (citations omitted) (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S.
at 516)); see also State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480, 493 (Fla. 2006) (concluding the Florida anti-kickback
statute was preempted because it “presents an obstacle to the accomplishments of the purposes of
the federal law”).
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California and Florida cases, this is tantamount to presenting an obstacle
to Congress accomplishing its purpose under the respective federal statute.
Such an obstacle results in federal preemption and invalidation of state law
under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.204 That being said, a federal
statute that does not explicitly prohibit certain conduct does not
automatically render that conduct as lawful or permitted. As the California
court observed, there is a difference between not making an activity
unlawful and making the activity lawful.205
The argument for the unenforceability of the TPSA would maintain that
Congress’s failure to specifically prohibit non-Federal health care program
remuneration practices is equivalent to Congress’s authorizing those same
practices. “[I]f that were so, there would be no room for state regulation,”
irrespective of any potential evidence of federal intention to the
contrary.206 Subscription to this line of reasoning means that if some
conduct is prohibited by federal law, state regulation of that conduct
would necessarily be superfluous (because Congress has already covered
it).207 Alternatively, it would mean that if the conduct is not prohibited by
federal law (making it “permitted” under the perspective that the TPSA is
ambiguous), state regulation of the conduct would be preempted (because
the federal government has already “permitted” it).208
The Anti-Kickback Statute does not seem in harmony with such a
narrow perspective.209 The OIG’s statements of purpose regarding the

204. See supra note 151 (discussing the federal conflict preemption theory in conjunction with
a state law action).
205. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
206. Viva! Int’l Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 162 P.3d
569, 583 (Cal. 2007); see also Man Hing Ivory & Imports, Inc. v. Deukmejian, 702 F.2d 760, 763
(9th Cir. 1983) (discussing the potential conflict between state and federal statutes and concluding the
“general language [of the federal Endangered Species Act regarding preemption], by its terms, does
not forbid state statutes such as California Penal Code § 653o. Rather, it allows full implementation
of section 653o so long as the state statute does not prohibit what the federal statute or its implementing regulations
permit. The Act itself nowhere authorizes the importation or sale of African elephant products by
permit or by exemption. Indeed, it prohibits the sale or import of endangered species unless such
import or sale is specifically authorized or exempted” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citing
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a))).
207. Viva!, 162 P.3d at 583.
208. Id.
209. In 1991, the Office of the Inspector General provided clarity as to the intent of the
federal statute in relation to state law: “There is no federal preemption provision under the statute.
Thus, conduct that is lawful under the federal anti-kickback statute or this regulation may still be
illegal under State law. Conversely, conduct that is lawful under State law may still be illegal under
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Anti-Kickback Statute’s Safe Harbors illuminate a different approach.210
Congress directed the OIG to “permit[] certain non-abusive arrangements,”
and gave the Department of Health and Human Services the “authority to
protect certain arrangements and payment practices under the anti-kickback
statute.”211 What the Anti-Kickback Statute “permits” are those certain
arrangements—the specific and explicitly enumerated arrangements in
both the Safe Harbor regulations and the exemptions under the federal
statute.212 These are the permitted “payment practices [that] shall not be
treated as a criminal offense under” the Anti-Kickback Statute,213 which
the TPSA contemplates at TOC § 102.003.214 They are not, however,
merely referral remuneration schemes that do not implicate Federal health
care programs—on which the Anti-Kickback Statute is silent.215
Once again, there is a difference between not making an activity
unlawful and making that activity lawful; or, for purposes here, not making
a specific payment/business arrangement prohibited, and making that
payment/business arrangement permitted.216 The Anti-Kickback Statute
and its Safe Harbor regulations specifically and expressly protect certain
conduct.217 The distinction of which to be mindful is that the federal law

the federal anti-kickback statute.” Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG
Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35952, 35957 (July 29, 1991) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
210. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of the
Initial OIG Safe Harbor Provisions and Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor Provisions Under
the Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. 63518, 63518 (Nov. 19, 1999) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
1001) (expressing the purpose of the safe harbors of the federal statute were to respond to concerns
that certain innocuous commercial arrangements were criminalized under the originally promulgated
statute); Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback
Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35958 (asserting the purpose of the promulgation of safe harbors was to
limit the prohibitions of the anti-kickback statute and protect certain innocuous arrangements, not to
expand the regulatory reach of the statute).
211. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of the Initial
OIG Safe Harbor Provisions and Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor Provisions Under the
Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. at 63518 (emphasis added); Medicare and State Health Care
Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35957 (emphasis
added).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2015).
213. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952.
214. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 102.003 (West 2012).
215. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Anti-Kickback Statute and the purpose of the
regulatory Safe Harbors promulgated thereunder).
216. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
217. The Anti-Kickback Statute, itself, specifies illegal conduct and, by virtue of its statutory
exemptions at § 1320a-7b(b)(3) and its Safe Harbors, it protects specific conduct. Medicare and State
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prohibits certain conduct and has in place specified protected payments
and arrangements, while also being altogether indifferent to other
payments and arrangements (i.e., non-Federal health care program
business).218 The Anti-Kickback Statute specifically permits certain
conduct in its statutory exemptions and Safe Harbor regulations.219
Concurrently, it does not prohibit kickbacks that do not implicate the
Federal health care programs.220 And therein lies the necessary
distinction between permitting certain conduct and not prohibiting other
kinds of conduct. The former requires proactive measures, such as
establishing Safe Harbor regulations.221 The latter requires nothing more
than passive silence, which the Anti-Kickback Statute certainly maintains
regarding referral arrangements not reimbursable by the Federal health
care programs.222
If, prior to the 1993 amendments, the Texas Legislature incidentally, if
not unintentionally, allowed the TPSA’s construction provision to mean
that all non-Federal health care program arrangements are legal under the
TPSA because those arrangements were not prohibited under the AntiKickback Statute, the legislature certainly cleared up that confusion in
1993. The change in language from “not prohibited” to “permitted” must
be construed to be deliberate and intentional.223 The change must have
Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35952, 35954
(July 29, 1991) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012).
219. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of the
Initial OIG Safe Harbor Provisions and Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor Provisions Under
the Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. 63518, 63518 (Nov. 19, 1999) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
1001) (“The OIG safe harbor provisions have been developed ‘to limit the reach of the statute
somewhat by permitting certain non-abusive arrangements, while encouraging beneficial and
innocuous arrangements.’” (quoting Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse;
OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35957)).
220. See, e.g., id. (providing the only prohibited activity under the federal act are those activities
that are “reimbursable under the Federal or State health care programs,” not private providers).
221. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback
Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35957 (indicating the intent behind promulgating such provisions is to
permit particular practices that are not subject to prosecution and thus are permitted by the
promulgation).
222. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (prohibiting only remuneration available “in whole or
in part under a Federal health care program,” not private providers).
223. See Ramos v. State, 264 S.W.3d 743, 751 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet
granted) (stating that if the legislature “enacted into law something different from what it intended, it
would amend the statute to conform to its intent” (citing State v. Vasilas, 187 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006))), aff’d, 303 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 452 (Tex. 2012) (“[T]he Legislature deliberately and purposefully selects
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also been intended to clarify that those precise “certain arrangements” the
Anti-Kickback Statute intentionally and specifically protects and permits
are the practices, business arrangements, and payment practices permitted
under the TPSA.224
In order to elucidate the purpose of the 1993 amendments regarding the
construction provision at TOC § 102.003, we may need to borrow some
logic from the California courts again. In Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v.
Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.,225 the California Supreme Court
discussed the relationship between two state statutes.226 The court
observed that California “Penal Code section 211, which defines robbery,
does not make murder unlawful. Most assuredly, however, that section
does not also make murder lawful.”227 This simple observation helps
reinforce the argument against spurious notions that the TPSA is
ambiguous or unenforceable. A flat prohibition of certain activity that
allows for expressly permitted exemptions, should not be read the same as
a flat allowance of certain activity with express forms of conduct being
prohibited. That which is not prohibited is not automatically permitted.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF ILLEGAL REMUNERATION SCHEMES
Having established an understanding that exchanging referrals for
remuneration poses genuine legal liability to physicians in Texas, this
Article now turns to how engaging in such practices has further reaching
implications than one may suspect.
By and large, lawsuits and
prosecutions of illegal remuneration arrangements have been brought
under the Anti-Kickback Statute.228 In pursuing its ongoing efforts of

words and phrases it enacts, as well as deliberately and purposefully omits words and phrases it does
not enact.” (citing Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex.
2010))); In re M.N., 262 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2008) (“[T]he Legislature included each word in the
statute for a purpose, and that words not included were purposefully omitted.” (citations omitted)
(first citing Eddins-Walcher Butane Co. v. Calvert, 298 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. 1957); and then citing
Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981))).
224. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (explaining the three different categories of
conduct—permitted, prohibited, and silent—and reasoning that federal silence is not construed as
permitting, rather it leaves it to the states to regulate the conduct).
225. Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527 (Cal. 1999).
226. See id. at 541 (illustrating the relationship between the California unfair competition law
and California Civil Code 47, which appeared to be in conflict).
227. Id.
228. James G. Sheehan & Jesse A. Goldner, Beyond the Anti-Kickback Statute: New Entities, New
Theories in Healthcare Fraud Prosecutions, 40 J. HEALTH L. 167, 167–68 (2007) (“Until recently,
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combatting federal health care program financial fraud, the federal
government has also found an extraordinarily potent tool in the False
Claims Act.229
The False Claims Act prohibits the knowing submission of false claims
for financial reimbursement from the government.230 This federal statute
also contains whistleblower provisions allowing private parties to initiate
lawsuits on behalf of the government and share in any recovery.231 That
provision provides an effective measure for ushering fraudulent schemes
out of the shadows by essentially rewarding insiders for bringing the
arrangements to the government’s attention.232 The government’s ability
to intervene thereafter (or at the inception in cases of governmentinstituted investigations),233 allows the Department of Justice to further
investigate illegal conduct.234 The effectiveness of the False Claims Act is
underscored by the fact that the Department of Justice has recovered
more than $17 billion under the statute since 2009.235
As healthcare business arrangements and regulations continue to
develop in complexity, and the relationships between medical

prosecutions have been based almost entirely on the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Kickback
Statute . . . .”).
229. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012); see also Press Release No. 15-431, Dep’t of Justice, Two
Cardiovascular Disease Testing Labs to Pay $48.5 Million to Settle Claims of Paying Kickbacks and
Conducting Unnecessary Testing (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/twocardiovascular-disease-testing-laboratories-pay-485-million-settle-claims-paying [https://perma.cc/
7R88-U9VC] (reporting on huge settlements resulting from False Claims Act lawsuits filed by
whistleblowers, resulting in roughly $50 million in settlement payments).
230. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A).
231. Private persons “may bring a civil action for a violation of [the False Claims Act] for the
person and for the United States.” Id. § 3730(b). The private person is, with certain exceptions,
allowed to receive 15–25% of the proceeds of any action or settlements of claims, if the government
proceeds with an action brought by the private person. Id. § 3730(d). The amount of proceeds such
a “qui tam” plaintiff may receive depends “upon the extent to which the person substantially
contributed to the prosecution of the action.” Id.
232. See, e.g., id. § 3730(d)(1) (providing payments to a person for assisting in deterring such
fraudulent behavior by rewarding them with not only the qui tam reward but also “an amount for
reasonable expenses which the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs”).
233. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
234. Id. § 3730(a).
235. Press Release No. 15-233, Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: The Health Care Fraud and
Abuse Control Program Protects Consumers and Taxpayers by Combating Health Care Fraud
(Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fact-sheet-health-care-fraud-and-abuse-controlprogram-protects-conusmers-and-taxpayers [https://perma.cc/QMR8-F7DF].
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practitioners, third-party payors, and patients consequently evolve,236
“opportunities for improper influence and fraud are increasing.”237
Consequently, prosecutors, regulators, and private litigants are responding
by exploiting the variety of statutes prohibiting fraudulent activities, and
positing new and unique legal theories to address the consequences of
these developing relationships.238 This section will now examine some of
the growing trends and specific examples of financial arrangements
between physicians and ancillary services facilities that are attracting
further scrutiny from lawmakers, law enforcement, and private actors. To
that end, it is necessary to discuss recent referral schemes that have been a
part of actual prosecutions or litigation, as well as analyze the additional
legal theories under which plaintiffs and prosecutors are seeking redress.
A. Recent Enforcement and Legal Actions against Referral Schemes
The current legal landscape of prosecutions of referral-for-remuneration
schemes features a combination of government enforcement actions and
commercial payor lawsuits. Some of the more recent and prominent cases
involve the public and private interests overlapping. The takeaway from
the following examples is that the number of investigations and the degree
of scrutiny are increasing along with the fraudulent activity they seek to
suppress. Not least of which is Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Humble
Surgical Hospital,239 the only reported court case involving private recovery
based in part on a violation of the TPSA.

236. See, e.g., Emma Mata & Jonathan Ishee, The Out-of-Network Battle Heats Up, ABA HEALTH
(Sept. 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/aba_health_esource/20142015/september/out_of_network.html [https://perma.cc/AT5N-HJNP] (discussing the growing
complexity of healthcare providers waiving or reducing of patients’ “portion of financial
responsibility associated with receiving out-of-network services by the provider” and the tension
such billing practices are establishing between providers and third-party payors). See generally Charles
C. Dunham, Out-of-Network Referrals and Waiver of Patient Copayments and Deductibles: The Battle Between
Payors and Providers Endures and Intensifies, HEALTH LAW., June 2013, at 18, 18–21 (discussing out-ofnetwork provider billing practices, particularly the practice of waiving copayments and deductibles,
and the resistance and push back to such practices of insurers).
237. Sheehan & Goldner, supra note 228, at 168.
238. Id.
239. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Humble Surgical Hosp., LLC, No. H–12–1206, 2016 WL 7496743
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2016), appeal dismissed sub nom., 17-20123, 2017 WL 3753665 (5th Cir. Apr. 5,
2017).
ESOURCE
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Aetna v. Humble

In 2012, Connecticut-based Aetna Life Insurance Company (Aetna)
sued Humble Surgical Hospital, LLC (Humble)—a five-bed hospital in
Humble, Texas—for defrauding Aetna of millions of dollars.240 As an
out-of-network healthcare provider, Humble set its own fees for services it
provided to Aetna beneficiaries rather than functioning under an
agreed-upon fee schedule.241 Aetna would then pay a certain amount of
Humble’s fees pursuant to each of its member’s policies.242 The member
would be required to pay more out of pocket for the balance not covered
by Aetna than if the member had used an in-network hospital.243 Humble
was accused of joining with over a hundred doctors in a referral scheme in
which the physicians would receive 30% of the facility fees Humble
collected from Aetna for the patients they referred.244
In an attempt to disguise the referral arrangement, the referring
physicians created limited liability companies (Physician LLCs), that would
pretend to assume Humble’s medical billing responsibilities.245 In reality a
third-party affiliate of Humble, K&S Consulting, LLC, would perform the
billing in exchange for 5% of the fees collected from Aetna.246 K&S
Consulting would charge Aetna, who would pay Humble Aetna’s
permitted amounts for each bill, and Humble would kickback the 30% of
the facility fees paid by Aetna to the Physician LLCs.247
As an additional element of the scheme, to prevent patients from
choosing cheaper, in-network hospitals, Humble promised patients that
their out-of-pocket costs would be waived or reduced to be no more than
they would otherwise be with an in-network provider.248 This particular
policy was in stark contradiction to all of Aetna’s insurance plans.249
240. Id. at *1–2.
241. See id. at *2 (“Humble is an out-of-network hospital, but it did not oblige patients to pay
out-of-network amounts. Instead, it told patients that its services’ costs would be equal to or less
than at an in-network facility.”).
242. Id. at *1.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at *2.
248. Id. at *1. Humble also promised that if Aetna paid the bills in full, the patients may
possibly be afforded a refund. Id.
249. Aetna’s plans have three characteristics worth noting: “(a) the insurer pays a portion of
the patient’s bill; (b) the insurer pays a smaller portion when the patient uses a hospital with which
the insurer does not have a fee schedule, and (c) the insurer does not pay when a hospital waives the

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

43

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 4, Art. 2

792

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:749

Those plans provided that Aetna would not pay any fees if a hospital
waived the patient’s share of the fees.250 Furthermore, Aetna alleged that
Humble “breached its written representations to Aetna” when submitting
billing forms.251 The form explicitly stated “that the beneficiary’s cost
share has not been waived by consent or failure to exercise generally
accepted billing and collection efforts.”252
Aetna sued Humble under various legal theories, and the district court
granted Aetna relief under a claim for money had and received.253 Under
this cause of action, Aetna was required to “show that Humble ha[d] been
paid money that—in equity—belong[ed] to Aetna.”254 The court
permitted Aetna to recover the amount of money Humble wrongly
received from Aetna in violating Texas’s prohibition of payments to
doctors in exchange for patient referrals.255
The court determined that Humble attempted to characterize its
agreements with the Physician LLCs as leases for use of the hospital.256
But because the Physician LLCs were not licensed under title 25 of the
Texas Administrative Code, section 133.21, they could not legally lease
hospitals.257 The court held that Humble’s agreements with the Physician
LLCs were not leases but referral-fee arrangements in violation of the
TPSA.258 Consequently, the court decided that Aetna was entitled to
patient’s share.” Id. Aetna argued that, not only did Humble overcharge it, but Humble failed to
charge patients in a fashion required by the plan, failed to provide the services for which it was
charging, and paid kickbacks to the referring doctors—which are all in contravention to the
characteristics listed above. Id. at *3.
250. Id. at *1.
251. Aetna’s First Amended Complaint at 9, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Humble Surgical Hosp.,
LLC, 4:12-cv-01206 (Feb. 8, 2013).
252. Id.
253. Aetna, 2016 WL 7496743, at *2.
Other claims included fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and relief under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Id.
254. Id. (citing Staats v. Miller, 243 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex. 1951)).
255. Id. at *4. The court allowed Aetna to choose among three remedies: (1) recovery of $41
million in overpayments to Humble, attributable to Humble having no right to be paid under Aetna’s
contracts with patients without a proper assignment to a patient’s benefits; (2) recovery of $20
million under a finding that Texas does not allow hospitals to bill patients one way and insurance
plans in a different manner, and this recovery amount was the difference between what Aetna paid
Humble as on out-of-network provider and what it would have paid Humble as an in-network
provider (pursuant to the manner in which Humble billed the patients); and (3) $12 million pursuant
to violations of the TPSA. Id.
256. Id. at *2.
257. Id. (citing 25 Tex. Admin. Code § 133.21(c)(1) (2017) (Tex. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., Hospital License)).
258. Id.
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approximately $12 million, representing the 30% of fees it overpaid to
Humble, which Humble paid to the Physician LLCs as kickbacks.259
While this case does not represent a physician’s investment in facilities
that provide ancillary health services, it does address a broader concern:
kickback/referral schemes are not limited to criminal investigations and
prosecutions. Private actors, specifically insurance companies, are using
statutes prohibiting such conduct to buttress their claims for redress
against the participants in such schemes. And despite the sparse legal
reasoning for the relief granted in Aetna v. Humble, this federal case reflects
a distinct judicial unwillingness to allow remuneration-for-referral schemes
to defraud patients or the private payors responsible for the billed fees.260
Several other recent federal cases have considered the TPSA in regard
to referral schemes; but the courts in those cases have determined that the
TPSA does not grant a private right of action, or they have dismissed
state-law claims under other rationales.261 For the time being, Aetna v.
259. Id.
260. The court’s reasoning and decision under Aetna v. Humble is notably terse and pointed, as
a seeming intimation of the court’s unwillingness to brook Humble’s unlawful schemes or its
rationales therefor; to wit, when the court considered Humble’s contention that the doctrine of
unclean hands applied, the court summarily dismissed the argument, merely stating, “Aetna’s hands
are clean. Humble is filthy up to the elbows from lies and corrupt bargains.” Id. at *3. And in
prefacing its conclusion of Aetna’s entitlement to relief, the court stated, “This case has had a
tortured existence, and the bulk of activity has been trying to force Humble to tell the truth. Humble
has conducted guerilla warfare against this court, Aetna, the patients, and common decency.” Id.
at *4.
261. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Elite Ctr. for Minimally Invasive Surgery, LLC,
No. 4:16–CV–00571, 2017 WL 607130, slip op. at *15 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 15) (determining that the
provisions of the Texas Occupations Code do not provide a basis for a private right of action),
amended and superseded in part by 2017 WL 1807681 (May 5, 2017). Connecticut General v. Elite Center, also
held—contrary to Aetna v. Humble—that the insurance companies’ claims for equitable relief under
state law, specifically for money had and received and unjust enrichment, were preempted by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA): “[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates,
supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional
intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted.” Id. slip op. at *11. The
court concluded that recovery under a theory of money had and received required “the Court [to]
determine the nature of the benefits [the insurance companies were] required to pay, which
necessarily [directed the] Court’s inquiry to the plans, require[d] an analysis of the plans’ terms, and
presumably involve[d] the calculation of payments due to members/patients under the various
plans.” Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Humble Surgical Hospital, LLC, No. 4:13-CV-3291, 2016 WL
3077405, at *13 (S.D. Tex. June 1, 2016), reversed and vacated in part by 878 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2017).
Consequently, the court in Cigna v. Humble determined the insurance companies’ claims for equitable
reimbursement under a claim for money had and received and unjust enrichment were preempted by
ERISA “as they refer and/or ‘relate to’ the various plans.” Id. (citing Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. &
Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420, 432 (5th Cir. 2004)). But see Aetna, 2016 WL 7496743, at *3 (holding that
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Humble provides a current, but perhaps vague, blueprint as to how
insurance companies may pursue action against participants in
remuneration-for-referral schemes.
2.

Testing Laboratories

Clinical laboratories are among the most prominent examples of
ancillary services facilities that have been exposed to legal scrutiny for
illegal kickback schemes. Physicians’ investment in clinical labs to which
they may regularly refer high volumes of patient specimens is an economic
relationship that causes particular concern for law enforcement.262 There
exists a symbiosis between physicians and clinical labs that is entirely based
on referrals and patient patronage. When a physician becomes involved in
a financial relationship with the laboratory, the question of whether the
physician is directing her patients’ business to that laboratory for the
physician’s own pecuniary interests becomes an inherent concern in the
referral arrangement.263 Among the many enforcement actions and
lawsuits directed at laboratories alleged to have suspicious referral
arrangements with physicians, those surrounding Sky Toxicology, Ltd. and
its affiliate laboratories are particularly noteworthy.
Aetna’s claims of money had and received were not preempted by ERISA because they did not seek
to enforce the insurance plans, but rather sought to “recoup the money Humble tricked it into paying
for no benefit at all to the patients; the plans are merely the context of Humble’s fraud” and that
ERISA “does not give comprehensive regulations and procedures for all eventualities that might be
tangentially related to a benefit plan. . . . [and is] silent about overpayment by an insurer to a
provider”). It is also noteworthy that this case involved the exact same hospital, Humble, during
overlapping periods, but that the Cigna v. Humble court did not consider violation of the TPSA as
justification for a claim of money had and received, as the Aetna v. Humble court did; rather, the Cigna
v. Humble court denied relief under the TPSA based solely on there being no private right of action
under the Texas Occupations Code. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 2016 WL 3077405, at *15–16; see also
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., slip op. at *15 (holding that the TPSA does not provide a private right of
action, and the plaintiff had no right to enforce the TPSA or seek a declaratory judgment related to a
violation of the TPSA).
262. See generally LABORATORY PAYMENTS TO REFERRING PHYSICIANS, supra note 25, at 1
(addressing the issue of “compensation paid by laboratories to referring physicians and physician
group practices . . . for blood specimen collection, processing, and packaging, and for submitting
patient data to a registry or database”); Special Fraud Alert: Arrangements for the Provision of
Clinical Lab Services, 59 Fed. Reg. 65377, 65377 (Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Dec. 19, 1994)
(notice) (discussing anti-kickback statutes and their relation to arrangements for the provision of
clinical lab services).
263. See Special Fraud Alert: Physician-Owned Entities, 78 Fed. Reg. 19271, 19272 (Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs. Mar. 29, 1993) (notice) (noting that because of “the strong potential for
improper inducements between and among the physician investors[ and these] entities . . . ventures
should be closely scrutinized under fraud and abuse laws” (footnote omitted)).
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Sky Toxicology, Ltd.

In July 2015, Connecticut General Life Insurance Company and Cigna
Health and Life Insurance Company (collectively, Cigna) filed a lawsuit
against Sky Toxicology, Ltd., a Florida-based urinalysis lab, and its
Texas-based affiliate labs (collectively, Sky Labs) for $20 million in
overpayments.264 In 2016, UnitedHealth Insurance Company also sued
Sky Labs for $50 million in overpayments attributable to its fraudulent
operations.265 The pleadings alleged that Sky Labs constructed a
complicated artifice to defraud private payors pursuant to an improper
referral kickback scheme.266 The scheme induced physicians and drug
treatment centers to refer their patients to its out-of-network facilities by
offering ownership interests in one or more of the laboratories.267
The insurance companies ascribed their millions in losses in
overpayments to Sky Labs’ business model, which allegedly offered
financial kickbacks to referring physicians and drug treatment centers in
exchange for referrals of excessive and medically unnecessary urinary
analysis tests.268 In an effort to conceal the financial inducements to the
referral sources, Sky Labs allegedly contrived an investment structure in
which the referring physicians and treatment centers were offered
ownership interests in one or more of its labs.269 The physicians and
264. The other named defendants were Florida-based Sky Toxicology Lab Management, LLC,
and Texas laboratories Frontier Toxicology, Ltd. and Hill Country Toxicology, Ltd. Complaint at 1,
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:15-cv-80994-WJZ (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2015);
see also Complaint at 1, UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:16-cv-806649-RLR
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2016) (identifying the incorporated states and home offices of the same
defendants in the Cigna case).
265. See generally Complaint at 44, UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:16cv-806649-RLR (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2016) (bringing multiple causes of action against the defendants,
including $50 million resulting from fraudulent conduct). UnitedHealthcare named numerous
additional defendants, including general partners of the various limited partnership laboratories and
the business entities and individuals responsible for referrals to the defendant laboratories. Id. at 6–
13.
266. Id. at 23.
267. Id. at 23–24; see also Complaint at 2–3, Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd.,
No. 9:15-cv-80994-WJZ (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2016) (“Sky Labs has been inducing physicians and drug
treatment centers to refer patients, including, but not limited to Cigna plan members, to their
out-of-network laboratories by offering the referring providers ownership interests in the entities
operating the laboratories, and then paying the referring providers kickbacks in the form of
‘dividends,’ which relate to the number of specimens referred to the laboratories.”).
268. Complaint at 3, UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:16-cv-80649RLR (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2016).
269. Id.
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treatment centers would refer patients to the labs for screenings, and, in
exchange, the labs would remit monthly profit distributions to these
interest-owning referral sources.270 Those distributions were based on
revenues generated by the referrals. If the referrals decreased or stopped,
Sky Labs was entitled, and threatened, to “redeem” the ownership interests
or withhold the monthly distributions.271
Sky Labs would also routinely waive or fail to adhere to patients’
cost-sharing responsibilities, irrespective of the patients’ ability to pay, and
then submit claims to the insurer without disclosing the waiver
practice.272 These concessions served as additional inducement for
patients to use Sky Labs’ services and prevented the insured patients from
requesting to receive laboratory services from an in-network provider.273
Finally, to artificially increase reimbursements from the insurance
companies, Sky Labs purportedly required physicians to order tests that
bundled panels together, rather than allowing for selection of only
medically necessary individual panels for patients.274 The bundled panels
would include extra screening tests that would inevitably drive up the cost
of services Sky Labs would perform and thus, be able to bill the insurance
company for payment.275

270. Id.; see also Complaint at 12, Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:15cv-80994-WJZ (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2015) (“Physicians and treatment centers that meet the referral
quota receive kickbacks in the form of ‘dividends’ that are based on the profits of the laboratory,
which in turn, are based on reimbursements for the referred patients.”).
271. Complaint at 3, UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:16-cv-80649RLR (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2016); see also Complaint at 12, Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology,
Ltd., No. 9:15-cv-80994-WJZ (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2015) (“Upon information and belief, if a physician
or treatment center investor does not meet the specimen referral quota, Sky Labs may repurchase or
‘redeem’ the shares from the investor.”).
272. Complaint at 3, UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:16-cv-80649RLR (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2016); Complaint at 13, Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd.,
No. 9:15-cv-80994-WJZ (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2015).
273. Complaint at 3, UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:16-cv-80649RLR (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2016); see also Complaint at 13, Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology,
Ltd., No. 9:15-cv-80994-WJZ (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2015) (“Sky Labs concealed the cost of its services in
furtherance of its scheme to induce patients to use its services and prevent members from requesting
to receive such services from an in-network provider.”).
274. Complaint at 28, UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:16-cv-80649RLR (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2016); Complaint at 11, Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd.,
No. 9:15-cv-80994-WJZ (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2016).
275. See Complaint at 28, UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:16-cv80649-RLR (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2016) (“Lab Defendants, under the direction, control, and
management of Individual Defendants, billed United for services not ordered by Referring
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In May 2016, Cigna and Sky Labs entered into an undisclosed
settlement.276 UnitedHealth sought leave to amend its complaint to
resolve questions of federal jurisdiction after its case was dismissed in
November 2016.277 The insurance companies’ claims for relief were
based mostly on tortious activity and private rights of action under state
deceptive trade practices statutes;278 however, the insurers also predicated
part of their claims on violations of Florida and Texas anti-kickback
laws.279
The significance of these cases rests in the fact that commercial payors
pursued legal actions against healthcare providers for engaging in
Defendants, and required Referring Defendants to order custom test panels, which included tests
that were not medically necessary and were selected only to maximize the payments from United.”).
276. Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd.,
No. 9:16-cv-80649-RLR (S.D. Fla. Nov. 11, 2016).
277. Compare id. at 1–2 (disclaiming the court’s jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state law claims
and lack of standing to assert claims under ERISA), with Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Order of
Dismissal to Allow Leave to File an Amended Complaint Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
59(e) and 60(b) at 5, UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:16-cv-80649-RLR
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2016) (“ERISA relief is now limited to claims not yet paid and future conduct,
and seeks no monetary judgment. Recovery for claims already paid is now sought only in United’s
state law tort claims. Because United is no longer requesting ‘other equitable relief’ under ERISA in
the form of restitution for amounts it paid to the Defendants, the Court’s basis for dismissal is no
longer present.”). The day after UnitedHealth’s suit was dismissed in the Florida District Court, Sky
Labs sued UnitedHealth in the Western District of Texas for, among other causes of action, breach
of contract and claims under ERISA. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint at 12–21, Sky Toxicology, Ltd. v.
UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co., No. 5:16-cv-01094-FB-RBF (W.D. Tex. Nov. 11, 2016). As of
February 27, 2018, Sky Labs and UnitedHealth have exchanged settlement offers and agreed to
mediate their claims on or prior to December 14, 2018. Parties’ Report on Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Compliance with Local Rule CV-88 at 1, Sky Toxicology, Ltd. v. UnitedHealthcare
Ins. Co., No. 5:16-cv-01094-FB-RBF (W.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2018).
278. See Complaint 31–32, UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:16-cv80649-RLR (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2016) (alleging the waiver of patient responsibilities was a direct
violation of the Florida deceptive practices act and “caused significant economic harm to United
because Lab Defendants’ fraudulent insurance claims induced United to make millions of dollars of
payments that it was never obligated to make”); see also Complaint at 26, Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v.
Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:15-cv-80994-WJZ (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2015) (“Sky Labs also deceived
Cigna by submitting false, grossly inflated charges to Cigna that did not reflect Sky Labs’ actual
charges to patients. Sky Labs’ fraudulent fee-forgiving scheme has and continues to harm Cigna’s
business.”).
279. Complaint at 51, UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:16-cv-80649RLR (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2016) (alleging that failing to disclose the “services were the direct result of a
patient-referral kickback scheme[,]” which was a violation of the Florida and Texas anti-kickback
statutes); Complaint at 20, Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:15-cv-80994-WJZ
(S.D. Fla. July 17, 2015) (expressing the opinion that intentionally failing to disclose the anti-kickback
scheme violated the laws of both Florida and Texas).
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referrals-for-remuneration schemes that they alleged defrauded their
members and insurance plans. More applicable to this Article is the fact
that UnitedHealth not only named the laboratories as defendants, but that
it also sought relief from the referral sources—both business organizations
and individuals—as conspirators engaged in a scheme to defraud the
insurer.280
Multimillion dollar lawsuits like those instigated by Cigna and
UnitedHealth are but a reflection of the expanding breadth of liabilities
that healthcare providers should be wary of in their referral relationships.
Federal and state governments are not the only enforcement agents
confronting illegal remuneration schemes. Aside from criminal and civil
penalties under state and federal statutes, referrals-for-remuneration
arrangements have an effect on private parties who will seek to protect
their own interests.281 Sky Labs illuminates the potential legal liabilities
associated with referral sources owning investment interests in ancillary
services providers. A different kind of kickback scenario underlies the
referral scheme involving Health Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc.
b.

Health Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc.

Health Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc. (HDL) was a Virginia-based
laboratory specializing in blood testing for cardiovascular diseases.282
Similar to Sky Labs, HDL was sued by Cigna in 2014 for a scheme in
which HDL, as an out-of-network provider, submitted bills to Cigna at
exorbitant rates while waiving patients’ obligations to pay copayments,
coinsurance, or deductibles.283 Cigna and HDL settled the $84 million
lawsuit for $59 million.284 In a related suit, another insurance company,

280. See supra note 264 (providing a list of the named defendants in UnitedHealthcare’s
complaint).
281. See infra pp. 152–53 (explaining the wide range of actors who participate in these lawsuits,
including private parties attempting to recoup losses sustained due to the violation).
282. See Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint at 2, Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Health Diagnostic
Laboratory, Inc., No. 3:14-cv-01519-VAB (D. Conn. Jan. 16, 2015) (noting HDL is a provider of
routine laboratory services which is considered an out-of-network provider under Cigna’s plans).
283. Id.
284. The settlement was a part of HDL’s bankruptcy proceedings, wherein Cigna has been
established as a Class 4 Claim in the bankruptcy estate. Katie Demeria, Ex-Richmond Blood-Testing
Firm Settles $59M Suit Brought by Cigna, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (June 21, 2016),
http://www.richmond.com/business/local/article_7afd33e9-5114-57d5-b4f8-b5af58b64e6a.html
[https://perma.cc/DAF5-JAUM].
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Aetna, Inc., sued on similar grounds and also procured a multimillion
dollar settlement agreement.285
Aside from allegations of HDL’s inducements to patients by waiving
their copayments, the laboratory was also accused of engaging in an illegal
kickback arrangement.286 In exchange for physicians referring their
patients’ blood testing services to HDL, the laboratory would pay the
physicians excessive processing and handling fees for collecting blood
from their patients.287 Medicare and private insurance companies
generally permit fees of $3 per blood draw.288 It was purported that HDL
paid between $10 and $17.289 HDL began its legal issues with the
government when it was confronted with qui tam (private whistleblower
Thereafter the
action) lawsuits under the False Claims Act.290
291
Soon following, HDL agreed to
Department of Justice intervened.
resolve the allegations against it by settling with the government for $47
million.292
Despite the fact that HDL’s kickback scheme did not involve physician
ownership in a referral entity or remuneration through ownership
285. See generally Aetna, Inc. v. Health Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc., No. 15-1868, 2015 WL
9460072, at *10 (E.D. Penn. Dec. 28, 2015) (denying defendants motion to dismiss Aetna’s claims on
all counts). The settlement in Aetna, which is a purported $77.4 million, is also a part of HDL’s
bankruptcy proceedings; however, Aetna is an unsecured creditor, and Aetna’s settlement has been
split into two categories: $49.5 million is a Class 3 claim, and the remaining $27.9 million, like Cigna,
is a Class 4 claim. Katie Demeria, HDL Settles $77.4 Million Aetna Lawsuit, RICHMOND TIMESDISPATCH (Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.richmond.com/business/article_44294a9b-ea59-5385-8514e42826b7e051.html [https://perma.cc/SWN3-HZE6].
286. See Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint at 14, Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Health Diagnostic
Laboratory, Inc., No. 3:14-cv-01519-VAB (D. Conn. Jan. 16, 2015) (noting the recent OIG alert
indicating that such improper payments implicate the Anti-Kickback Statute).
287. Id. at 24.
288. Larry Husten, Inside the Scandal: Profit and Greed at an Embattled Laboratory
Company, FORBES PHARMA & HEALTHCARE (Apr. 21, 2015, 8:32 AM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/larryhusten/2015/04/21/inside-the-scandal-profit-and-greed-at-an-embattled-laboratorycompany/#7e6386b32789 [https://perma.cc/33UJ-7S8P].
289. Press Release No. 15-431, supra note 229; Husten, supra note 288. Another deviation
from industry standards was the fact that for most clinical laboratories, physicians order an average
of 2.2 to 2.8 tests on a single patient. Id. HDL performed on average 31 tests per requisition, further
evincing its inducement of physicians to order medical unnecessary tests. Id.
290. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mayes v. Berkeley HeartLab Inc., 225 F. Supp. 3d 487,
(D.S.C. 2016) (indicating Mayes qui tam action was one of three independent actions). “The lawsuits
were filed by Dr. Michael Mayes, Scarlett Lutz, Kayla Webster and Chris Reidel under the qui tam, or
whistleblower, provisions of the False Claims Act.” Press Release No. 15-431, supra note 229.
291. Press Release No. 15-431, supra note 229.
292. Id.
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distributions, it proves to be a poignant cautionary tale. First, HDL’s
incredible early success was eventually curtailed by government
enforcement actions and commercial payor lawsuits.293 The aggregate toll
of these financial setbacks and the reduction in HDL’s business in the
wake of its legal disputes ultimately landed HDL in bankruptcy.294
Second, in spite of the assurances physicians or HDL may have
provided—that the laboratory would waive the patients’ obligatory
out-of-pocket payments—the patients eventually suffered. In the course
of HDL’s bankruptcy proceedings, HDL’s bankruptcy estate recruited a
Florida collection agency to pursue payments from more than 9,000
patient accounts.295 The bankruptcy estate has sought reimbursement
from thousands of former HDL patients for “overdue bills” totaling more
than $50 million dollars.296 In one case, a California woman received a
bill for $2,883.80 for blood testing done two years prior.297 Her insurer
had previously denied payment because it said the blood work was
unnecessary.298
Third, HDL’s bankruptcy trustee is actively pursuing recovery of certain
fraudulent transfers made by HDL prior to filing bankruptcy.299 To the
extent that the process and handling fees HDL paid to physicians
constitute fraudulent or otherwise avoidable transfers, HDL’s liquidating
trustee is seeking recovery from the physicians of those remunerations.300
293. Id.
294. Demeria, supra note 285. Contributing to HDL’s lag in business was the OIG’s 2014
publication issuing guidance that paying processing and handling fees to physicians who send blood
samples is an arrangement facing potential liability under the federal Anti-Kickback Statute. See
LABORATORY PAYMENTS TO REFERRING PHYSICIANS, supra note 25, at 1 (“[W]e have repeatedly
emphasized that providing free or below-market goods or services to a physician who is a source of
referrals, or paying such a physician more than fair market value for his or her services, could
constitute illegal remuneration under the anti-kickback statute.”); see also Husten, supra note 288
(warning doctors who accept remuneration will be subject to DOJ scrutiny).
295. Katy Stech, Health Diagnostic Laboratory Patients Face Bills Years After Blood Work, WALL
STREET J. (May 16, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/health-diagnostic-laboratory-patients-facebills-years-after-blood-work-1463428248 [https://perma.cc/MT29-BYKJ].
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See Order Authorizing Creditors Committee to Conduct Bankruptcy Rule 2004
Examinations of the Debtors and Certain Third Parties at 2, In re Health Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc.,
No. 15-32919-KRH (E.D. Va. Oct. 27, 2015) (authorizing the committee to investigate whether there
were any intentional or constructive fraudulent transfers that should be returned to the estate).
300. See Motion of Creditors Committee for an Order Authorizing it to Conduct Bankruptcy
Rule 2004 Examinations of the Debtors and Certain Third Parties at 13, In re Health Diagnostic
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These cases not only affect the laboratories themselves, but the
investors, the referring parties, and, as in the case of HDL’s bankruptcy,
sometimes the patients. HDL also presents a unique wake-up call to
attorneys providing legal counsel to laboratories and other ancillary
services facilities. In 2015, HDL’s bankruptcy trustee filed claims against
the law firm LeClairRyan, rooted in legal services the firm provided HDL
during its primary operation years.301 Nearly a year later, the firm settled
with the estate for $20.375 million.302 The terms of the settlement
agreement were not an admission of guilt, but LeClairRyan’s chief legal
officer made a sobering observation: “[T]he pursuit of litigation claims
against law firms has become quite commonplace as one of the ways
trustees try to raise funds to pay off claimants in bankruptcy cases.”303
HDL’s legal proceedings demonstrate the wide breadth of legal issues,
claimants, liable parties, and even victims of illegal remuneration referral
arrangements involved in such schemes. Not only is the government
pursuing enforcement of the Anti-Kickback Statute and the False Claims
Act, but commercial payors are attempting to cover their bottom lines by
going on the offensive and recouping funds they deemed illegally obtained;
insiders are initiating suits against the health care providers via qui tam
suits; and bankruptcy estates are throwing the kitchen sink into legal
proceedings, attempting to recoup any and all possible funds from
whomever they can rationalize a reasonable legal claim against—including
seemingly innocent (if not entirely oblivious) patients and former legal
counsel. Above all, the aforementioned laboratories represent the legal
vulnerability of referral relationships with ancillary services facilities when
some kind of compensation is involved and, just as important, the
heightened scrutiny these arrangements are receiving from various
government forces and private actors.

Laboratory, Inc., No. 15-32919-KRH (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2015) (requesting permission to examine
the unlawful inducements used to cause patients to utilize the out-of-network services).
301. See Katie Demeria, HDL Reaches $20M Settlement with LeClairRyan, RICHMOND TIMESDISPATCH (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.richmond.com/business/local/article_4e705fac-f07b-54539c4f-22a0dc91350f.html [https://perma.cc/BFR5-2CB2] (asserting HDL’s claims against LeClair
Ryan were “rooted in the legal services that LeClairRyan provided HDL from the Richmond-based
blood testing firm’s formation in 2008 until its bankruptcy filing in 2015”).
302. Id.
303. Id.
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The Growing Concern over Compounding Pharmacies

While the federal government’s focus is increasingly directed toward
physician-owned entities and payments for referrals, and private litigants
are pursuing redress against fraudulent activity, the state of Texas does not
outright prohibit physician ownership in ancillary services facilities.304
The current legal landscape of the state, however, displays a growing
interest in physicians’ relationships with, and ownership in, their referral
facilities.305 The Texas AG has recently displayed increasing interest in
physician involvement with compounding pharmacies.306
A recent string of investigations has delved into the relationship
between compounding pharmacies and the physicians who refer business
to them, particularly in the wake of a recently enacted Texas statute.
Effective as of September 2015, the Texas State Board of Pharmacy
(Pharmacy Board) may inspect a pharmacy’s “financial records relating to
the operation of the facility.”307 The Pharmacy Board may only inspect
such records in the course of investigating a specific complaint against the
pharmacy, and then, “only [those] records related to the specific
complaint.”308
The last two restrictions may seem to be sterilizing provisions of an
otherwise powerful law, but consider the recent fraud investigations
against a Dallas area company, RXpress Pharmacy.309 “Disgruntled

304. Kevin Krause, Texas Pharmacy Regulators Have New Law to Scrutinize
Financial Ties to Doctors, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.dallasnews.
com/news/crime/2016/02/09/texas-pharmacy-regulators-using-new-law-to-scrutinize-financial-tiesto-doctors [https://perma.cc/8VWU-8B7A] (recognizing that under Texas law, “[i]t’s legal for
physicians to own or invest in a pharmacy . . . as long as they disclose it to patients who they refer to
the business”).
305. See generally id. (“Physician ownership and investment in compounding pharmacies is
starting to get more attention and scrutiny with an expanding federal investigation of kickbacks in
Texas and other states.”); Woodruff & Kreick, supra note 21 (“Although the Texas Attorney General
has investigated compounding pharmacies before, the [Civil Investigative Demands] involved here
focus on physician ownership, investment, and financial relationships, which may indicate increased
enforcement activity in an area that has seen relatively little scrutiny.”).
306. See Woodruff & Kreick, supra note 21 (recognizing that the Texas AG is beginning to
focus on physician ownership of compounding pharmacies).
307. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 556.051(a)(6) (West 2012).
308. Id. § 556.051(b).
309. Keven Krause, North Texas Pharmacy in Federal Probe is Accused of Paying
Kickbacks to Doctors, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.dallasnews.
com/news/investigations/2016/02/05/north-texas-pharmacy-in-federal-probe-is-accused-of-payingkickbacks-to-doctors [https://perma.cc/83NX-QM93] (“Federal authorities are investigating a
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business partners and a pharmacy tax adviser [brought] accusations
against” the pharmacy when they each filed separate lawsuits.310 The tax
adviser alleged that RXpress paid kickbacks to physician-owners in the
form of investor dividends in exchange for the physicians writing
RXpress
prescriptions to bolster the pharmacy’s business.311
subsequently came under investigation by federal authorities.312 The
accusations of former associates swung the door wide open for the
Pharmacy Board to inspect the pharmacy’s financial records.313 These
records may confirm the veracity of the kickback’s allegations, and the
Pharmacy Board may then pass along such information to state or federal
investigators.314
The Texas AG’s office has also made recent use of its ability to issue
Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs) to several physicians who have
ownership interests in the compounding pharmacy, Healthscripts of
America.315 CIDs are investigative tools that the Texas AG’s Consumer
Protection Division may use in the course of an investigation under the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)—a consumer protection law
that proscribes false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of trade or commerce.316 CIDs generally require the issuant to
produce documentary materials the Consumer Protection Division
believes the issuant may possess that are relevant to the subject matter of
the DTPA investigation.317

North Texas compounding pharmacy accused of paying illegal kickbacks to physicians for writing
prescriptions . . . .”).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. See id. (“The FBI said it could not confirm or deny the existences of an investigation.”).
313. See OCC. §§ 556.015(a)(6), (b) (permitting investigation into a pharmacy’s financial
records after a specific complaint has been filed against the company).
314. See id. (referring to “financial records” but failing to define what the term encompasses).
What remains uncertain is what actually constitutes as a “financial record,” and whether those
financial records would disclose the ownership records of physicians. Id.
315. See Woodruff & Kreick, supra note 21 (recognizing the effort of the Texas AG to combat
healthcare fraud and abuse through its issuance of Civil Investigative Demands to some physician
investors of Healthscripts Specialty Pharmacy).
316. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (West Supp. 2017) (prohibiting deceptive
trade practices); see also id. § 17.61 (West 2011) (allowing CIDs).
317. See id. § 17.61(a) (“Whenever the consumer protection division believes that any person
may be in possession . . . of any documentary material relevant to the subject matter of an
investigation of a possible violation of this subchapter, an authorized agent . . . may execute a writing
and serve on the person a civil investigative demand . . . .”).
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In regard to Healthscripts, the CIDs made requests for documents
“showing all prescribers who have purchased an interest [in] any
compounding pharmacy.”318 Physician investors were asked to produce
documents “showing the amount of remuneration of any kind paid to
these prescribers who invested money or other types of investments in any
compounding pharmacy.”319 CIDs are a common tool for the AG’s
office, but it is a rare occurrence for CIDs to inquire into physician
investors’ financial records and communications related to
remuneration—quite obviously information that charters the waters of the
TPSA.320 If anything, such a dramatic shift from standard CIDs usage
provides some indication that state authorities are developing a growing
interest in physician ownership interests in ancillary services facilities.321
The fact that the state has an interest in the ownership records of a
health care provider may very well signal Texas’s desire to pursue
investigations of physician-owned entities.
The statute permitting
inspection of pharmacy financial records may simply be the first stop.
Upon inspection of such records revealing referring physicians having
ownership interests in these pharmacies, the TPSA seems to be the next
logical stop, which may result in the beginning of prosecutions thereunder.
4.

A Note on Investment Structures
a.

Investment Structures in Ancillary Services Entities Generally

Blatant illegal remuneration arrangements like the examples in this
Article’s introduction are easy situations to spot.322 Even the HDL
scheme had clear paper trails of checks written to physicians for
318. Woodruff & Kreick, supra note 21 (quoting Petition to Partially Set Aside Civil
Investigative Demands and for Protective Order, In re Healthscripts Specialty Pharmacy, No. D-1GN-15-000380 (53d Dist. Ct. Travis Cty., Tex. Jan. 30, 2015)).
319. Id. (quoting Petition to Partially Set Aside Civil Investigative Demands and for Protective
Order, In re Healthscripts Specialty Pharmacy, No. D-1-GN-15-000380 (53d Dist. Ct. Travis Cty.,
Tex. Jan. 30, 2015)); see also Merritt, supra note 18 (noting that CIDs sought documents from
individual physicians who had dealt with Healthscripts).
320. Merritt, supra note 18 (“While DTPA CIDs are common, it is very rare to see DTPA
CIDs asking physician investors for financial records and any communications related to an
investment covered by the Solicitation of Patient statue.”).
321. In addition to the attention in Texas, in January of 2016, “the FBI and other police
agencies raided nine compounding pharmacies in Mississippi and seized more than $15 million in
assets.” Krause, supra note 309. “[S]everal Florida pharmacies also agreed [in 2015] to pay millions
to settle civil allegations that they had improper financial relationships with doctors.” Id.
322. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
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overcharged, unnecessary expenses.323 But when those arrangements are
concealed within varying degrees of investment entities, such as ownership
interests in limited partnerships and limited liability companies, the
illegitimacy is more difficult to identify (which is likely the point). As a
practical consideration, then, the structure of investments in ancillary
health care facilities may help provide a glimpse into the potential liability
it may cause for investors.
The attorney reviewing these investment structures may often find that
the business entity that operates the ancillary services facility is broken up
into two sets of owners. First, there are the investors who are capable of
referring business to the facility—usually individual physicians, physician
practice groups, or other business entities owned by persons who can refer
patients (collectively, Referring Investors).324 On the other side of the
coin are the Non-Referring Investors—persons or investment groups who
may not be health care professionals and who tend to be a part of the
company’s governance (Non-Referring Investors).325 The business
entities often distinguish Referring Investors from Non-Referring
Investors by separating them into two classes of owners (e.g., Class A
Members and Class B Members).326
323. See Larry Husten, Inside the Scandal: Profit and Greed at an Embattled
Laboratory Company, FORBES PHARMA & HEALTHCARE (Apr. 21, 2015, 8:32 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/larryhusten/2015/04/21/inside-the-scandal-profit-and-greed-at-anembattled-laboratory-company/#7e6386b32789 [https://perma.cc/33UJ-7S8P] (“The reason the
company sent paper checks, according to one source, is because Tonya Mallory, the CEO, told
employees that ‘doctors love to see the paper checks in their hand.’”).
324. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)(1)(ii) (2015) (referencing “an investor in a position to
make or influence referrals”).
325. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at 9–10, UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology,
Ltd., No. 9:16-cv-80649-RLR (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2016) (referring to the Non-Referring Investors as
the corporate officers or the various lab entities).
326. Cf. ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 274 (12th ed. 2014) (demonstrating the separation of investors into
ownership classes is a common practice in various business ventures). Among other reasons,
however, separating investors into classes based on their ability to refer business to the company is
frequently done in a vain and perfunctory attempt to satisfy the Safe Harbor—an exemption from
criminal prosecution under the Anti-Kickback Statute regarding returns on certain investment
interests. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952. This Safe Harbor requires, among numerous other requirements,
that Referring Investors may hold no more than 40% of the investment interests of each class of
interests in a 12-month period. Id. § 1001.952(a)(2)(i). More importantly, this Safe Harbor requires
that no more than 40% of the gross revenue of the company may come from business generated by
the Referring Investors in a given 12-month period. Id. § 1001.952(a)(2)(vi). Ancillary services
companies tend to attempt to satisfy this Safe Harbor by limiting the membership of Referring
Investors to 40% of the total ownership interests. The companies inevitably fail to satisfy this Safe
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Ordinarily, business organizations that are used as vehicles for medical
practitioners’ investment in ancillary services facilities are a part of normal,
legally-permitted investment strategies. The circumstances become less
legally tenable, however, when those business entities are used to funnel
kickbacks to physicians for their referrals to the ancillary services facilities.
In Sky Labs, we saw that the Referring Investors owned interests in one of
the various business structures that operated the laboratories involved in
the asserted illegal remuneration artifice.327 The allegations claimed that
Referring Investors would refer business to those laboratories.328 In
exchange, those investors would receive remuneration from the business
entities in the form of company profit distributions that were generated by
the referrals.329 The Non-Referring Investors would similarly receive
company distributions from the various labs’ profits.330
These entities usually have partnership agreements, limited liability
company agreements, or corporate bylaws that control the governance and
rights of interest owners (collectively, Bylaws).331 These Bylaws seldom
contain a smoking-gun provision that mandates Referring Investors refer
business to the respective ancillary services facilities.332 Instead, these
governing documents provide that Referring Investor ownership interests
may be owned only by persons who are actively able to make those kinds
Harbor, however, because 100% of the companies’ revenues are generated by those same Referring
Investors.
327. See First Amended Complaint at 2–3, UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd.,
No. 9:16-cv-80649-RLR (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2016) (alleging the physicians that refer specimens to the
labs are not actually “investors” being paid “investment distributions” but actually just being paid
“kickbacks” from their referrals). Sky Laboratories, Ltd. was a limited partnership, and the affiliated
labs were either limited partnerships or for-profit corporations. See id. at 6–9 (“Defendants utilize
multiple corporate entities in an attempt to shield themselves from liability for their fraudulent
conduct.”).
328. See id. at 6 (claiming the separate entities would refer business to the labs by sending
urine specimens for drug testing).
329. See id. at 2–3 (describing the “investment” distribution process—an “investor” sends the
lab a certain number of referrals per month and then receives an “invest distribution,” typically much
larger than the initial “investment”).
330. See id. at 6 (explaining the physicians would make money by acquiring ownership of the
limited partnership labs through equity ownership in the general partner, which was typically some
type of limited liability entity).
331. See, e.g., id. at 10 (referencing “subscription agreements” and explaining that the
agreement formalized the “kickback” the Referring Investor would receive in exchange for referrals
to the labs).
332. See Complaint at 11, Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:15-cv80994-WJZ (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2015) (indicating the deception employed by Sky Labs in failing to
disclose its cost sharing responsibilities in conjunction with its services to either patients or insurers).
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of patient referrals.333 Further, the Referring Investors’ interests are
commonly subject to redemption provisions that allow for the company to
repurchase or redeem the Referring Investor’s interests upon the unilateral
decision of the governing board.334 Referring Investors who are not
complying with the company’s business plan may be forced to sell their
interests.335
These are all tactics that may be employed to compel Referring
Investors to refer business to the ancillary services facilities in which they
have invested. Simultaneously, these tactics may help shroud any
company’s conditions that ownership interests and the receipt of profit
distributions be based on mandatory referrals. The Bylaws provisions and
company policies may also assist in accomplishing a third goal of
preventing the Referring Investors from free-riding the company’s profits.
Mandatory sales and redemption clauses allow these companies to
essentially kick out Referring Investors not contributing to the scheme.336
Armed with this kind of tool, ancillary services facilities can prevent
sharing profits with Referring Investors who are not actively participating
in the referral-for-remuneration scheme.337
Despite these red-flag company policies, when the business entity has
numerous investors, the sheer volume of investors may allow for passive
333. See id. at 11–12 (highlighting only those physicians who meet minimum referral
requirements may participate in the ownership interest).
334. See, e.g., id. at 12 (“Upon information and belief, if a physician or treatment center
investor does not meet the specimen referral quota, Sky Labs may repurchase or ‘redeem’ the shares
from the investor.”).
335. The author has reviewed numerous prospective investor information documents that
inform potential investors that their shares in the company may be redeemed if the Referring
Investor, for instance, disrupts the affairs of the company or if the company’s governing board solely
determines that the investor has been deemed unsuitable to remain an investor for any reason or no
reason. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at 43–45, UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology,
Ltd., No. 9:16-cv-80649-RLR (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2016) (redeeming investment shares upon failure to
send the requisite number of specimens).
336. See Complaint at 12, Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:15-cv80994-WJZ (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2015) (explaining penalties exist for those who do not substantially
contribute to sales quotas); First Amended Complaint at 3, UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Sky
Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:16-cv-80649-RLR (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2016) (“If an ‘investor’ slows or stops
sending specimens to a lab, the Officers threaten to rescind the ‘investment’ or withhold the monthly
distributions until the specimens start flowing again.”).
337. This kind of policy, where the company is allowed to retain the right to repurchase the
interests of investors upon the investor’s failure to refer business to the company, is a particular
characteristic the U.S. Office of the Inspector General has stated it finds highly suspicious for illegal
activity. Special Fraud Alert: Physician-Owned Entities, 78 Fed. Reg. 19271, 19272 (Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs. Mar. 29, 1993) (notice).
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Referring Investors who do not contribute significant referrals. As
mentioned, targeting motivated referral sources for investment and
including mandatory sales and redemption provisions in Bylaws help
alleviate these kinds of free-rider concerns. Recently, however, ancillary
services companies dependent on investor referrals have begun to utilize a
newer investment structure to secure against free-riding Referring
Investors. This investment structure seeks to accomplish all of the referral
policies described above, without the red flags, in the form of the Series
Limited Liability Company.
b.

The Series Limited Liability Company

The Series Limited Liability Company (Series LLC) is a limited liability
company (LLC) that provides for a series of members, managers,
ownership interests, or assets.338 The series is not a separate domestic
entity under Texas law. Rather, the series “has separate rights, powers,
[and] duties with respect to specifi[c] property or obligations of the” LLC
under which it is formed.339 Each series has the ability to sue and be
sued, enter contracts, and hold assets separate from the broader LLC.340
As we saw above, all of the Referring Investors in the ancillary services
company are a part of a general class of interest-owning members. Each
of those members are expected to contribute to the company by referring
business to the LLC. If any investors within that class do not refer
patients, and the LLC still makes distributions to the class of members, the
Referring Investors who did not refer may still be entitled to the
distributions.341
In the Series LLC, however, the ancillary services company can separate
ownership classes into numerous series, having as few as one Referring
Investor and Non-Referring Investor per series.342 What this means is
338. TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE ANN. § 101.601(a) (West 2009).
339. Id. § 101.601(a)(1).
340. Id. §§ 101.605(1)–(3). The series may also grant liens and security interests in the series’
assets as well as exercise all necessary powers or privileges to conduct the series’ business. Id.
§§ 101.605(4)–(6).
341. This is, of course, dependent on whether the non-contributing Referring Investor has
been discovered and forced to sell their shares back to the company. See supra notes 336–37 and
accompanying text.
342. See Carol R. Goforth, The Series LLC, and a Series of Difficult Questions, 60 ARK. L. REV.
385, 387 (2007) (“[A]n LLC that observes the statutory requirements for this new form of business
can set up distinct series of ownership, management and economic rights, where each series owns
and controls specific assets, and as to which liability is limited.”).
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that the overarching Series LLC can conduct one business of running a
laboratory, compounding pharmacy, or other ancillary services facility.
Meanwhile, each Referring Investor, along with the Non-Referring
Investor, would be in an individual series of the LLC. Because each series
is allowed its own members, managers, liabilities and duties, distributions
from company profits would not be organization-wide.343 The managers
within the series (usually the Non-Referring Investor’s appointees) decide
when to make distributions.344 And then, those distributions would not
come from the profits of the broader LLC, but from the profits of the
respective series.345
Instead of simply dividing Referring Investors and Non-Referring
Investors into respective classes of interest-owners within the entire
organization, the Series LLC allows the Non-Referring Investor to be a class
member separate from another class of as few as one Referring Investor in
each series. The Series LLC, therefore, benefits the ancillary services
company that depends on referrals by helping eliminate the cost of
Referring Investors who are not actively referring business. If the series in
which the Referring Investor(s) is, is not profitable due to fewer referrals
generating fewer company revenues, the company can simply ignore that
series. The series’ governing authority is not obligated to distribute profits
from the LLC to the individual, unprofitable series.346
This investment structure avoids the red-flag Bylaws provisions or
mandatory referral company policies. The incidental effect of the
structure, however, is that the smoking gun is no longer an explicit Bylaw
provision. The smoking gun is now the tie between the profitability of
each series and the number of referrals made by the Referring Investors in
that series. In other words, in a regular LLC or other investment entity,
free-riding referring investors who collect distributions, despite their
failure to refer business, at least allow an inference that distributions from
the company are not solely conditioned on referrals. But the Series LLC
343. See id. (stating losses incurred by one series do not impact members of another series).
344. See id. at 387–88 (“The series LLC provision also includes a number of subsections
explaining how series are to be managed, operated, and dissolved.”).
345. See id. at 402 (highlighting whether the IRS and courts consider each individual series as
distinct partnerships for the purposes of distributing profits).
346. See TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE ANN. § 101.252(1) (West 2009) (conferring management of a
limited liability company’s business affairs to the governing authority of the LLC according to the
company agreement); id. § 101.613(a) (“A limited liability company may make a distribution with
respect to a series.”); id. § 101.609(c) (discussing the powers and rights of governing persons and
officers within a series).
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allows an observer to recognize the direct correlation between profit
distributions to Referring Investors and the number of referrals they made
to the ancillary services facility. The fewer Referring Investors there are in
a series, the more apparent that relationship is. A Referring Investor who
fails to refer business to an ancillary services facility affects the return of
distributions that a series is able to issue much more than an LLC at large.
Despite there being no explicit company policies or Bylaws provisions
mandating Referring Investors to refer business to the company, the Series
LLC has its own smoking gun. The direct correlation between a series’
profit distributions and the business attributable to the series’ Referring
Investors’ referrals establishes a convincing implication of an illegal
remuneration scheme. It seems that, irrespective of the structure of
investment in an ancillary services facility that requires its investors to refer
business, there is a traceable line connecting the distributions from the
company to the referrals the investors make.
B. Additional Legal Theories Implicating Referrals for Remunerations
Any prudent physician is capable of believing that because they have
invested in a modest yet respectable toxicology laboratory or radiological
imaging center, they are likely immune from prosecution under illegal
remuneration laws. The physician might particularly be subdued by this
notion if she has invested with the best intentions and actually does value
her patients’ wellbeing over her own pecuniary interests when making
referrals. But despite a physician’s good intentions, the relationship with
the ancillary services facility may still prove to be problematic.347
As previously discussed, in addition to the enhanced attention
government investigative authorities are paying ancillary services facilities
to which physicians refer business, insurance companies are levying
aggressive civil suits against physicians and other medical providers as a
means of combating healthcare insurance fraud.348 Numerous state and
federal laws that concern the financial relationships surrounding physician
347. See James J. Ferrelli, Civil Rico Actions on the Rise to Combat Healthcare Insurance Fraud,
DUANE MORRIS HEALTH L. (Feb. 17, 2015) (on file with St. Mary’s Law Journal) (“[P]laintiff
insurance companies assert that the defendants—two doctors, three medical professional
corporations, and the professional corporations’ alleged managers—engaged in a racketeering
scheme . . . .”).
348. See supra Parts III.A.1, III.A.2; see also Ferrelli, supra note 347 (“Over the past several
years, insurance carriers have aggressively pursued civil suits against doctors and other medical
providers in an effort to fight healthcare insurance fraud.”).
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referrals to ancillary services facilities are at the disposal of government
prosecutors and private litigants.349 There are, however, several notable
statutes in our analysis of the TPSA under which a commercial payor may
pursue action against allegations of fraud. The first among those is the
Federal Travel Act (Travel Act).350
1.

The Travel Act and Commercial Bribery

The Travel Act prohibits persons from using facilities in interstate or
foreign commerce (such as mail, e-mail, the Internet, facsimile or
telephone) with intent to:
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or (2) commit any crime
of violence to further any unlawful activity; or (3) otherwise promote,
manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management,
establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity and thereafter
performs or attempts to perform [such unlawful activity].351

The United States Supreme Court has held that Congress intended
“unlawful activity” under the Travel Act to encompass state commercial
bribery statutes.352 Thus, one may violate the Travel Act by traveling in
or using the facilities of interstate or foreign commerce with the intent to
promote or carry on a violation of a state bribery law.353
For insurance carriers, the Travel Act can be very useful in that it can
essentially transform what would ordinarily be a state-level crime into a
federal felony, thus providing insurers a better bargaining chip. In the case
of Texas physicians, the underlying state-level “unlawful activity” requisite
for Travel Act liability is the Texas Commercial Bribery Statute.354 This
statute establishes a criminal offense if a physician, without the consent of
her patient, “intentionally or knowingly solicits, accepts, or agrees to

349. See, e.g., the False Claims Act, supra notes 229–35 and accompanying text, and ERISA,
supra note 277 and accompanying text. Though these laws, among others, are noteworthy in the
discussion of health care fraud, the depth of their further analysis is beyond the purview of this
Article.
350. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012).
351. Id.
352. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 50 (1979) (holding state bribery statutes shall be
included in the Travel Act as envisioned by Congress).
353. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952(a) & (b)(i)(2).
354. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.43(2)(C) (West 2011) (noting physicians as a covered
group for the purposes of the statute).
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accept any benefit from another person [(which would include an ancillary
services facility) by] agreement or understanding that the benefit will
influence the conduct of the [physician] in relation to the affairs of [her
patient].”355
Even though there are no Texas cases in which a physician’s ownership
interest in an entity to which the physician refers patients is challenged
under the Commercial Bribery Statute, it is clear that such an arrangement
falls within its purview.356 Distributions or dividends of profits from an
investment in an ancillary services facility constitute the benefit accepted
under the statute.357 The law’s wording provides that, if the physicianinvestor refers a patient to a facility without disclosing her financial interest
to the patient, the physician is essentially accepting a bribe under the
statute.358
Incidentally, the TPSA and Commercial Bribery Statute overlap
regarding communication with the patient. In the Commercial Bribery
Statute, the key provision determining culpability is whether the physician,
as fiduciary, received consent from her patient, the beneficiary, to accept
the benefit of profit distributions from her ancillary services facility.359
Consent from the patient clearly implies notice to the patient about the
financial arrangement the physician maintains with the facility. In
circumstances where the remuneration arrangement is permitted under
section 102.001 of the TPSA, the physician is still required to inform the
patient of the arrangement in order to be free of criminal liability under

355. Id. § 32.43(b). The statute does not only apply to physicians and their patients, but rather
prohibits the conduct of a “fiduciary” when concerning their “beneficiary.” Id. § 32.43(a)(2)(C). The
statute defines “fiduciary” as, among other things, a physician. Id.
356. Incidentally, there is at least one federal case in which an insurance company sought
declaratory judgment that it is not liable for unpaid facility fees charged by an ambulatory surgery
center and shared pursuant to a remuneration-for-referrals scheme with numerous joined physicianowned professional association-plaintiffs, under the theory “that a party cannot recover for claims
that arise from its own illegal or fraudulent conduct,” namely, the plaintiffs violations of the Texas
Commercial Bribery Statute, among others. See DAC Surgical Partners v. United Healthcare Servs.,
Inc., No. 4:11-CV-1355, 2016 WL 7177881, slip op. at *14 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2016) (citing to the
Texas Commercial Bribery provision for holding the referral scheme criminal in Texas).
357. PENAL § 32.43(c) (“A person commits an offense if he offers, confers, or agrees to
confer any benefit the acceptance of which is an offense under Subsection (b).”).
358. See generally id. § 32.43(b) (“A person who is a fiduciary commits an offense if, without the
consent of his beneficiary, he . . . agrees to accept any benefit from another person on agreement or
understanding that the benefit will influence the conduct of the fiduciary . . . .”).
359. See id. (detailing the importance of consent in determining whether a bribe has occurred
on behalf of the physician).
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section 102.006 of the TPSA.360 Therefore, otherwise permitted referral
remuneration arrangements require disclosure to—and in the case of the
Commercial Bribery Statute, consent from—the patient, regarding the
physician’s ownership interest in the arrangement.
To assert that the Texas Commercial Bribery Statute and the Travel Act
are potential mechanisms through which a health insurer may fight health
care fraud is not to suggest that the government cannot prosecute
physicians thereunder. First and foremost, a violation of the Texas
Commercial Bribery Statute is a state felony.361 In addition to
imprisonment, the law authorizes a court to sentence the physician to “pay
a fine in an amount fixed by the court, not to exceed double the value of”
any benefit the court finds the physician gained through the commission
of an offense under the Commercial Bribery Statute.362 Violation of the
Travel Act is a federal felony, punishable by fine, imprisonment, or
both.363
The larger implication here is that a physician’s investment in an
ancillary services facility may give rise to a violation of the Texas
Commercial Bribery Statute. Culpability under the Commercial Bribery
Statute allows the Travel Act to piggyback on the same conduct.
Consequently, the illegal conduct establishing violations of the
Commercial Bribery Statute and the Travel Act may arm an aggrieved
insurance carrier with a more formidable means of recourse—one fraught
with onerous ramifications: the federal Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act.364
2. The Effect of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act
The federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) prohibits a person from “invest[ing] in, acquir[ing] an interest in,
maintain[ing] control over[,] or conduct[ing] the affairs of, an ‘enterprise’,

360. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§102.006(a)(1)–(2) (West 2012) (“A person commits an offense
if: the person, in a manner otherwise permitted under Section 102.001, accepts remuneration to
secure or solicit a patient . . . and does not, at the time of initial contact and at the time of referral
disclose to the patient . . . .”).
361. PENAL § 32.43(d).
362. Id. §§ 32.43(d)–(e).
363. 18 U.S.C §§ 1952(a)(3)(A)–(B) (2012).
364. Id. §§ 1961(1)–(10).
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by means of a ‘pattern’ of ‘racketeering activity.’”365 The federal
government can bring a RICO case against a physician based on the
physician’s violation of the Texas Commercial Bribery Statute.366
Similarly, insurers can, and in recent years have, become more aggressive
in seeking reimbursement for funds wrongfully or fraudulently received by
medical providers by filing a civil RICO claim.367 What makes RICO
such an attractive tool for insurers, and such a threatening maneuver
against physicians, is that the civil RICO claims provide victorious
claimants under the statute with treble damages, attorney’s fees, and
costs.368 In recent years large insurance carriers have brought cases
yielding recoveries in the millions of dollars in actual damages.369
Notwithstanding the fact that insurance companies may bring civil
RICO claims against physicians who have clearly defrauded the company,
the insurers may have another motive in mind. Managed care plans
motivated by economic factors may be inclined to keep beneficiaries
entirely in network, rather than allow physicians to refer specialists,
diagnostic testing, or imaging services outside of the covered network. To
accomplish this, an HMO, for instance, may provide in their physician
contract, that physicians suffer a financial penalty for referring out of the
network or for specialty consultations with whom the HMO disagrees.370
365. Stuart P. Green, Official and Commercial Bribery: Should They be Distinguished?, in MODERN
BRIBERY LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 44 (Jeremy Horder & Peter Alldridge eds. 2013).
366. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (specifying that an act of bribery that is chargeable under a State
law constitutes as the predicate, underlying “racketeering activity” for a RICO claim). There appear
to be no cases in which RICO has been used in conjunction with commercial bribery. Green, supra
note 365, at 45.
367. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (“Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor…”). See generally First Amended Complaint
at 506–47, UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Sky Toxicology, Ltd., No. 9:16-cv-80649-RLR (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 29, 2016) (discussing the existence of viable RICO claims).
368. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
369. Matthew J. Smith, The Rico Act: How to Use the Statute to Aggressively Seek Recovery Against the
Unscrupulous, CLAIMS MGMT., Apr. 2014, at 30, 32 (citing a $12 million award recovered by State
Farm Insurance, and a $6 million (trebled sum) award that Allstate recovered in a 2013 RICO case
against a chain of chiropractic clinics and related parties); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Plambeck,
802 F.3d 665, 676 (5th Cir. 2015) (“RICO provides civil remedies to ‘[a]ny person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(2012))), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1824 (2016); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lincow, 715 F. Supp.
2d 617, 632 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (highlighting State Farm’s RICO case against health care providers
attempting to defraud them), aff’d, 444 F. App’x 617 (3d Cir. 2011).
370. See David U. Himmelstein, & Steffie Woolhandler, Why the US Needs
a Single Payer Health System, PNHP.ORG (2010), http://www.pnhp.org/facts/why_the_us_needs_a_
single_payer_health_system.php [https://perma.cc/83JC-DP4F] (“HMO Payment incentives
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Alternatively, managed care plans may delist, or threaten to delist,
physicians for pecuniary reasons.
As a veritable “nuclear tactic,” large insurers with heavy-loaded
resources may threaten a civil RICO suit against a physician practice group
who owns a pharmacy to which the physicians refer their patients, but at
which the insurer simply does not want coverage for its beneficiaries. In
such a case, the insurer could simply threaten a lawsuit to recover the extra
expenditures the physician group caused the insurer in referring
beneficiaries to the pharmacy. As another option, as mentioned above, the
insurer can simply file a complaint against the physicians in the physician
group with the Texas AG or an overseeing administrative body (e.g., the
Pharmacy Board), alleging fraudulent practices between the ancillary
services facility and physicians. With respect to arrangements involving
remuneration for patient referrals, it may prove to be a more prudent
option to play nicely with an insurer than be delisted or run the risk of a
lawsuit or invasive investigation.
IV. MOVING FORWARD
The significance and potential severity of improper patient referral
arrangements is plain. The issue, however, remains that physicians and
their attorneys may be reading into the TPSA limitations that are not there;
and in other cases, these people may be justifying certain conduct that,
while illegal under the statute, they believe cannot be prosecuted under an
unenforceable law.
As discussed above, the contention that the TPSA is ambiguous or
unenforceable is directly traceable to the statute’s language found in its

increasingly pressure primary care physicians to avoid specialty consultations and diagnostic tests.”).
Texas, however, passed a law in 2015 that prohibits insurers from penalizing, terminating, restricting,
or prohibiting, in any manner, physicians or other health care providers with whom the insurer has a
provider agreement (a “preferred provider”), covering the preferred provider’s “communicat[ion]
with an insured about the availability of out-of-network providers.” TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
§ 1301.0058(a) (West 2015). Though this law does provide that “[a]n insurer’s contract with a
preferred provider may require that . . . the preferred provider inform the insured” patient, prior to
referring the insured to an out-of-network provider, that: (1) the insured has a choice between an
in-network and out-of-network provider; (2) the out-of-network provider may cause the insured
higher out-of-pocket expenses; and (3) if applicable, “the preferred provider has a financial interest in
the out-of-network provider.” Id. § 1301.0058(c).
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construction provision.371 The primary goal of this Article is to make
physicians and their health care attorneys better informed about the
proscriptions and liabilities under the TPSA. Given the potential for
physicians and their attorneys to misread the TPSA detailed herein, it is
imperative for the Texas legislature to take action and clarify its position
on illegal remuneration arrangements. Only by amending the TPSA to
clarify what conduct is permitted thereunder can the legislature protect
physicians from the dangers elucidated in this Article, rather than leave
them to face those dangers in court.
For these reasons, this Article suggests that the Texas Legislature amend
the construction provisions at TOC §102.003 to read as follows:
Section 102.001 shall be construed to permits any payment, business
arrangement, or payment practice permitted that 42 USC § 1320a-7b, or any
the regulations adopted under that law promulgated thereunder, has
expressly and specifically identified as a payment, business arrangement, or
payment practice that shall not be treated as a criminal offense under Section
1128B9(b) of the federal Social Security Act or serve as the basis of an
exclusion under section 1128(b)(7) of such Act, without regard as to whether
that payment, business arrangement, or payment practice implicates or is
reimbursable under Medicare, Medicaid, or any other state or “Federal
health care program” as that term is defined under 42 U.S.C. §1320a7b(f).372

This amendment language allows for greater specificity as to what kinds
of arrangements and practices are being permitted when the TPSA
references the Anti-Kickback Statute and the Safe Harbor regulations.
Specifically, this suggested language eliminates the possibility of
misinterpreting the TPSA to allow referral-for-remuneration arrangements
that do not implicate Federal health care programs. The language would
only permit those arrangements and practices that are explicitly referred to
as exempt arrangements and practices under the federal statute and Safe
Harbor regulations. This amendment would preclude the possibility of the
erroneous inferences or assumptions discussed herein.373 This kind of
371. See supra notes 182–95 and accompanying text; see also TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 102.003
(West 2012) (“Section 102.001 permits any payment, business arrangement, or payment practice
permitted by 42 U.S.C. Section 1320a-7b(b) or any regulation adopted under the law.”).
372. Portions of the current OCC. §102.003 that should be eliminated are indicated by
strikethroughs, and added language is denoted by double underlines.
373. See supra note 20–22 and accompanying text.
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clarity would help prevent physicians from investing in risky referral
arrangements and would allow their health care attorneys to better counsel
against such investments and structure safer, more compliant investment
strategies.
V. CONCLUSION
When the Texas Legislature enacted the TPSA in 1991, it had all of the
right motives in protecting patients from the corrupt business practices
and eventual abuses of health care professionals whose pecuniary interests
outweighed their better medical judgement. But in addressing the
overwhelming maladies of the mental health industry at the time, the
legislature left the state with an unclear criminal statute that many may
choose to ignore. Nevertheless, the importance of that law remains
today—maybe now more than ever as the health care industry changes and
becomes increasingly complex and competitive.
As of the time of publication of this Article, the TPSA has received
scant consideration in the courts, and other administrative bodies have
provided mixed guidance at best. Nevertheless, its enforceability seems
sound, as the guidance that is available has not suggested or implied that
the statute may be ambiguous or unenforceable. Further, the legislative
history and case law discussed in this Article intimate the TPSA’s reach to
be beyond that of its federal counterpart, affecting even those transactions
that do not involve Federal health care programs. And not only does the
TPSA present the potential for criminal punishment to violators, it also
has the possibility, among other illegal remuneration statutes, of subjecting
persons engaged in referral-for-remuneration agreements to significant
civil liability from increasingly aggressive insurance companies.
As necessary as it is to protect Texas’s healthcare patients, it is just as
important to protect the physicians who treat them. Our doctors are
engaged in investment ventures they have been lead to believe are
harmless, meanwhile their ignorance is leaving them exposed. Providing
health care professionals and their legal representatives with clear,
unequivocal information that seemingly innocent, industrious conduct may
actually be against public policy, will allow physicians to make
well-informed, prudent, and legal decisions about their referrals, their
investments, and their practices generally.
Leaving the TPSA as it currently stands would be a grave mistake and
would subject some of Texas’s finer doctors to the more acute austerities
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of laws they are being counseled are not relevant to them. If the State of
Texas is going to allow physicians to supplement their hard-won income
with profits from ancillary health care services, we should make the
limitations of that allowance clear and prominent enough for everyone to
recognize.
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